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THE PARADOX OF PREDATORY PRICING
Daniel A. Cranet
Predatory pricing law attempts to keep prices low by harshly sanctioning
prices that are anticompetitively low. The paradox of predatory pricing law
is that even an analytically perfect specification of the line between predatory
and innocent price cuts would result in deviations from optimal pricing be-
cause the very recognition of a predatory pricing offense will induce some
firms to forgo innocent price cuts. This occurs for several reasons. Firms can
strategically misuse predatory pricing law to coerce more efficient rivals to
forgo price cuts or to help organize tacit collusion schemes. Even apart from
strategic misuse, the remedial structure of antitrust law-including treble
damages, unilateral fee shifting, and ease in proof of damages-coupled
with unavoidable ex ante uncertainty over adjudicatory results and mana-
gerial risk aversion will cause some firms to raise their prices to avoid preda-
tory pricing litigation. No complete solution to the paradox exists, since both
the absence and presence of a legal prohibition on predatory pricing would
induce upward deviations from optimal pricing. Courts, Congress, and the
antitrust agencies can attempt to minimize the costs of maintaining a legal
prohibition on predation by adopting decisional rules that mandate deliber-
ate underinclusion in establishing liability norms and in adjudication.
They can also adopt procedural and remedial rules-such as detrebling
damages in predation cases, bilateral fee shifting, and limiting information
exchange in discovery-to minimize the costs of the predatory pricing
prohibition.
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INTRODUCTION
Predatory pricing is a paradoxical offense.1 Although antitrust
law values low prices and abhors high ones, 2 the "predator" stands
accused of charging too low of a price-of doing too much of a good
I One can, of course, believe that the entire antitrust enterprise is paradoxical. See,
e.g., ROBERT H. BoRKc, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978). Even so, the predatory pricing
offense is a particularly acute paradox, since it condemns as unlawful low prices, the main-
tenance of which is the very object of the antitrust laws.
2 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15 (1997) (explaining that charging lower
prices is beneficial to consumers and generally not a violation of antitrust laws); Ill. Brick
Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 756 (1977) (Brennan,J., dissenting) (quoting the Senate Re-
port accompanying Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 for proposition
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thing. Society considers predation socially harmful because the artifi-
cially low prices of today drive out competitors and allow the high
prices of tomorrow. But proof of actual high prices in the later time
period is not required, since even attempts at predation that never
succeed and never lead to monopolistic recoupment are con-
demned.3 "Predators" can face treble damage suits for pricing too
low, 4 even if they never offend the law's ultimate concern by pricing
too high.
Following the Chicago School of thought, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly worried that the existence of predatory pricing may per-
versely chill vigorous price competition. It has noted that "the mecha-
nism by which a firm engages in predatory pricing-lowering prices-
is the same mechanism by which a firm stimulates competition,"5 and
that "mistaken inferences . . . are especially costly, because they chill
the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect."'6 The
Court has commented that "[i]t would be ironic indeed if the stan-
dards for predatory pricing liability were so low that antitrust suits
themselves became a tool for keeping prices high."7 Seeking to avoid
this irony, the Court has set a high bar that predatory pricing plaintiffs
must hurdle.
Too high, according to many. In the past decade, some commen-
tators and courts have wonderedwhether the Supreme Court has be-
come too solicitous of price competition and too skeptical about
claims of predation.8 In a recent decision, the Tenth Circuit offered
that, in light of recent economic scholarship, it would not approach
predatory pricing cases with "the incredulity that once prevailed." 9
But "incredulity"-skepticism that firms would ever attempt predatory
that "[t]he economic burden of most antitrust violations is borne by the consumer in the
form of higher prices for goods and services").
3 Probabilistic harm in a future time period-to the degree of a "dangerous
probability"-suffices. See 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
726 (1996).
4 Such actions would need to be brought by competitors rather than consumers,
since consumers that enjoyed lower prices without ever getting to a period of recoupment
would lack any viable claim of antitrust injury.
5 Cargill, Inc. v. Montfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 122 n.17 (1986).
6 Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594
(1986)); see also Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
226 (1993) (same).
7 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 226-27.
8 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic Per-
spective, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 585 (1994); Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory
and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2242-62 (2000); Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost
Predatory Pricing, 111 YALE L.J. 941 (2002); Avishalom Tor, Illustrating a Behaviorally Informed
Approach to Antitrust Law: The Case of Predatory Pricing, ANTITRUST, Fall 2003, at 52, 55.
9 United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1115 (10th Cir. 2003). Despite ap-
proaching predatory pricing claims with less incredulity, the court affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment against the United States finding that none of the four
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pricing or succeed in it-was only one prong of the Chicago School
attack on predatory pricing theories. The other prong was the one
mentioned at the outset-that error in the specification of the legal
standard could chill vigorous price competition, thus causing preda-
tory pricing law to lead to a net increase in prices. To this latter
prong, the more credulous crowd has not yet offered a convincing
reply.
Perhaps that is because the "chilling price competition" claim was
posited but never established. Despite the claim that error in the legal
standard could chill vigorous price competition, no proof has yet
been offered that price competition has actually been chilled. The
absence of rigorous proof that "chilling" has occurred could be due to
the fact that the Supreme Court has gotten it right on the legal stan-
dard, thus avoiding the chilling it feared. But that account does not
seem wholly persuasive, since the Supreme Court did not begin to
reign in predatory pricing theories until the last two decades and still
has not resolved circuit splits in the lower courts over certain funda-
mental predatory pricing issues, such as the appropriate measure for
determining when a price is "below cost."' 0 Further, although it is
accepted wisdom that no predatory pricing plaintiff has won a verdict
since Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.," plaintiffs
have recently won some predatory pricing cases12 and procured sub-
stantial settlements in others.' 3 Additionally, regardless of their low
probability of success, plaintiffs continue to file a significant number
alternative cost-revenue models advanced by the government showed pricing below incre-
mental cost. See id. at 1120.
10 The Supreme Court has declined in three separate cases to decide what is the ap-
propriate measure of cost below which prices must be set in order to be condemned as
predatory. SeeBrooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222 n.1; Cargill, 479 U.S. at 117-18 n.12; Matsushita,
475 U.S. at 584-85 n.8.
11 See David F. Shores, Economic Formalism in Antitrust Decisionmaking, 68 ALB. L. REV.
1053, 1085 n.133 (2005); Bolton et al., supra note 8, at 2258-59; David Close, "Don't Fear the
Reaper": Why Transferable Assets and Avoidable Costs Should Not Resurrect Predatory Pricing, 88
IOWA L. REV. 433, 447 (2003); Edlin, supra note 8, at 941; Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago
Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 257, 312 (2001).
12 On September 27, 2002, a San Antonio jury awarded Kinetic Concepts, Inc., KCI
USA, Inc., and Medical Retro Design, Inc. $173.6 million in damages, before trebling, in
their federal predatory pricing suit against Hillenbrand Industries and Hill-Rom, its subsid-
iary. See Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Hillenbrand Indus., Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 722, 725-26
(W.D. Tex. 2003). The case was subsequently settled before appeal. See id. Further, Le-
Page's won a $22,828,899 jury verdict against 3M in a monopolization case based on 3M's
bundled discounts and rebates to retailers, which was later trebled by the court with judg-
ment entered for $68,486,697, plus interest. See LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 145 (3d
Cir. 2003) (en banc). The original Third Circuit panel majority and the en banc dissent-
ing judges saw the suit as essentially alleging predatory pricing. See id. at 179-80. Judge
Sloviter's en banc majority opinion rejected that characterization. See id. at 151; see also
Daniel A. Crane, Multiproduct Discounting: A Myth of Non-Price Predation, 72 U. CHi. L. REv.
27, 28-30 (2005) (discussing the LePage's characterization).
13 See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
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of federal predatory pricing cases, 14 suggesting that predatory pricing
complaints may afford plaintiffs strategic advantages whether or not
they ultimately prevail.
Given the importance of the chilling-price-competition assertion
to the development of predatory pricing doctrine, a closer examina-
tion of that claim is warranted. In exactly what ways, and to what de-
gree, does predatory pricing law chill price competition? Is some
chilling inevitable given that the law condemns pricing too low as an
offense, or are there structural means to minimize the incidence of
predatory pricing while also minimizing the collateral consequences
of recognizing a predation theory? The answers to these questions
should play a central role in the continuing debate over optimal struc-
turing of the predatory pricing offense, which appears poised to enter
a new phase of development stimulated by advances in behavioral eco-
nomics and game theory. It is insufficient to justify a particular stan-
dard of illegality for price cuts on the ground that the class of
prohibited price cuts is socially harmful. Rather, it is necessary to con-
sider whether the net effect of any legal rule prohibiting price cuts is
to induce higher or lower prices than those that would obtain in an
unregulated, or differently regulated, state given that any prohibition
on predatory pricing may also discourage some innocent price cuts.
Part I of this Article considers the most obvious way in which
predatory pricing law could adversely affect market pricing: If rival
firms strategically misuse predatory pricing law to discourage price
cutting, then predatory pricing law could lead to price increases.
Firms may strategically misuse predatory pricing law in several differ-
ent ways. Less efficient firms may use the threat of a predation lawsuit
to raise their rivals' costs and thereby overcome efficiency deficits.
Equally efficient firms may use predatory pricing litigation to help or-
ganize or enforce a tacit agreement on pricing. Finally, Part I consid-
ers whether there is evidence that firms in fact use predatory pricing
litigation for strategic purposes, and concludes that there is some evi-
dence suggesting that they do.
Part II considers the incentives that predatory pricing law creates
for firms to deviate from socially optimal pricing, particularly in com-
parison to the incentives that firms would face in an unregulated state.
Since both the existence of predatory pricing law and the absence of
such a prohibition would induce or permit deviations from optimal
pricing, some comparison of the likely effects of weak and strong
predatory pricing regimes on pricing behavior is necessary in formu-
lating the optimal legal rules. I argue that a number of remedial fea-
tures of antitrust law-including the treble damages remedy, fee
14 See infra note 18.
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shifting, and liberality in proof of damages-coupled with behavioral
influences on management decision-making, such as risk aversion
under conditions of significant uncertainty-suggest that predatory
pricing law may induce a substantial amount of deviation from opti-
mal pricing. Part II concludes by reporting the results of an informal
study of in-house lawyers that I conducted to understand the extent to
which predatory pricing law influences firms' pricing behavior in non-
litigation contexts.
Finally, Part III suggests some decisional and remedial ap-
proaches to predatory pricing law that could help to minimize the
costs of recognizing the predation theory. The adoption of decisional
rules mandating underinclusion in liability standards and adjudica-
tion and a precommitment to the adoption of predictable bright-line
rules would help to stem overdeterrence. Some remedial proposals
that others have raised-such as detrebling damages and eliminating
competitor standing in predatory pricing cases-are revisited in light
of a fuller appreciation of the market effects of predatory pricing law.
Several new proposals are also presented, including making fee shift-
ing bilateral and limiting discovery until the plaintiff demonstrates
that predation could plausibly have occurred in the relevant market.
In short, I argue that if a predation theory is to be recognized at all, it
must be tightly contained not only in terms of the specification of the
relevant liability rule but also in terms of the remedial structure of
predatory pricing litigation.
I
STRATEGIC USES OF PREDATORY PRICING THEORIES
A mainline view among legal scholars today is that the Supreme
Court's decisions in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp.' 5 and Brooke Group have made it virtually impossible for plaintiffs
to win predatory pricing cases. 16 While this pessimism may be some-
what overstated, 17 it raises an interesting question: If predatory pricing
cases are doomed to failure in light of Matsushita and Brooke Group,
why do so many plaintiffs continue to assert them? Since Brooke Group
was decided in 1993, at least fifty-seven federal antitrust lawsuits alleg-
ing predatory pricing have been filed, based on a survey of reported
decisions alone.' Many unreported federal suits probably have been
15 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
16 See supra note 11.
17 See supra note 12.
18 The following are reported federal cases involving a complaint alleging predatory
pricing filed after 1993. The search included predatory pricing claims asserted as monopo-
lization or attempted monopolization claims under § 2 of the Sherman Act and primary
line price discrimination claims under the Robinson-Patman Act, but did not include
claims made solely under state antitrust statutes or antidumping statutes. Covad
[Vol. 91:1
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Commc'ns Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 374 F.3d 1044 (11th Cir. 2004); Beech-Nut Nutrition
Corp. v. Gerber Prods. Co., 69 Fed. Appx. 350 (9th Cir. 2003); Mich. Paytel joint Venture v.
City of Detroit, 287 F.3d 527 (6th Cir. 2002); Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284 F.3d 1237 (11 th Cir.
2002); Lycon, Inc. v. Juenke, 250 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 2001); Taylor Publ'g Co. v. Jostens,
Inc., 216 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2000); Acoustic Sys., Inc. v. Wenger Corp., 207 F.3d 287 (5th
Cir. 2000); W. Parcel Express v. United Parcel Serv., 190 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 1999); Stearns
Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518 (5th Cir. 1999); Nat'l Parcel Servs., Inc. v.
J.B. Hunt Logistics, Inc., 150 F.3d 970 (8th Cir. 1998); Kentmaster Mfg. Co. v. Jarvis Prods.
Corp., 146 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 1998); C.B. Trucking, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 137 F.3d 41
(1st Cir. 1998); Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ltd., 133 F.3d 103 (1st Cir.
1997); Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430 (3d Cir. 1997); Creative
Copier Servs. v. Xerox Corp., 344 F. Supp. 2d 858 (D. Conn. 2004); Linens of Eur., Inc. v.
Best Mfg., Inc., 2004-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,548 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Alcom v. BP Prods. N.
Am., Inc., 2004-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,505 (D. Minn. 2004); Nobody in Particular
Presents, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc'ns, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (D. Colo. 2004);
Specialty Minerals, Inc. v. Pleuss-Stauffer AG, No. 98 Civ. 7775 (VM) (MHD), 2004 WL
42280 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 7, 2004); El Aguila Food Prods., Inc. v. Gruma Corp., 301 F. Supp. 2d
612 (S.D. Tex. 2003); Leopoldo Fontanillas, Inc. v. Luis Ayala Colon Sucesores, Inc., 283 F.
Supp. 2d 579 (D.P.R. 2003); E-Z Bowz, L.L.C. v. Prof'I Prod. Research Co., No. 00 Civ.
8670(LTS), 2003 WL 22068573 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2003); Blanchard & Co., Inc. v. Barrick
Gold Corp., 2003-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,172 (E.D. La. 2003); Masco Contractor Servs.
E., Inc. v. Beals, 279 F. Supp. 2d 699 (E.D. Va. 2003); McKenzie-Willamette Hosp. v.
Peacehealth, No. Civ. 02-6032-HA, 2003 WL 23537980 (D. Or. Aug. 15, 2003); Kinetic Con-
cepts, Inc. v. Hillenbrand Indus., Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 722 (W.D. Tex. 2003); Kuligowska v.
GNC Franchising, Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-2283, 2002 WL 32131024 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2002);
Berlyn, Inc. v. Gazette Newspapers, 223 F. Supp. 2d 718 (D. Md. 2002); DJ Mfg. Corp. v.
Tex-Shield, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.P.R. 2002); Tate v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 230 F.
Supp. 2d 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Mathiowetz Const. Co. v. Minn. Dep't of Transp., No. CIV
01-548, 2002 WL 334394 (D. Minn. Feb. 27, 2002); ASM Am., Inc. v. Genus, Inc., 2002-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 73,573 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Coventry Health Care of Kan., Inc. v. Via
Christi Health Sys., Inc., 176 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Kan. 2001); Lee v. Gen. Nutrition Cos.,
2002-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,777 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Yellow Page Solutions, Inc. v. Bell Ad.
Yellow Pages Co., 2002-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,556 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Eon Labs Mfg., Inc.
v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Mathias v. Daily News, L.P.,
152 F. Supp. 2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); United Magazine Co. v. Murdoch Magazines Distribu-
tion, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Peerless Heater Co. v. Mestek, Inc., 2000-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 72,917 (E.D. Pa. 2000); ACT, Inc. v. Sylvan Learning Sys., Inc., No.
C96-334, 2000 WL 34031484 (N.D. Iowa May 8, 2000);J & S Oil, Inc. v. Irving Oil Corp., 63
F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Me. 1999); Cohabaco Cigar Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., No. 98 C 1580,
1998 WL 773696 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 1998); CSY Liquidating Corp. v. Harris Trust & Sav.
Bank, No. 96 C 1216, 1998 WL 157065 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 1998); Malek Wholesaler, Inc. v.
First Film Extruding, Ltd., No. 97 C 7087, 1998 WL 142385 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 1998); Bush-
nell Corp. v. ITT Corp., 175 F.R.D. 584 (D. Kan. 1997); L&W/Lindco Prods., Inc. v. Pure
Asphalt Co., 979 F. Supp. 632 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 958 F.
Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Cardinal Indus., Inc. v. Pressman Toy Corp., 1997-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 71,738 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Clark v. Flow Measurement, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 519
(D.S.C. 1996); Hahn v. Rifkin/Narragansett So. Fla. CATV Ltd., 941 F. Supp. 1196 (S.D.
Fla. 1996); Aurora Gas Co. v. Presque Isle Elec. & Gas Co-Op, No. 96-CV-10093-BC, 1996
WL 627399 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 11, 1996); Barge v. DailyJournal Corp., 1996-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 71,541 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Westbank Yellow Pages v. BRI, Inc., 1996-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 71,448 (E.D. La. 1996); AD/SAT v. Associated Press, 920 F. Supp. 1287 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); Keller's Radiator Warehouse, Inc. v. Go/Dan Indus., 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
71,318 (D. Kan. 1996); Storis, Inc. v. GERS Retail Sys., Inc., Civ. A. No. 94-4400, 1995 WL
337100 (D.N.J. May 31, 1995); Bonollo Rubbish Removal, Inc. v. Town of Franklin, 886 F.
Supp. 955 (D. Mass. 1995); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Graphnet, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 126
(D.N.J. 1995).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:1
filed as well. 19 Are all of these plaintiffs Don Quixotes tilting at wind-
mills? That is unlikely given the cost and complexity of predatory
pricing litigation. If obtaining a money judgment is doubtful in light
of Matsushita and Brooke Group, the objectives of predatory pricing
plaintiffs may be other than simply exacting money from a vulnerable
adversary.20 As recognized by a number of authors, business rivals
may use antitrust laws for a variety of strategic objectives. 21
Predatory pricing law is perhaps the most susceptible of all anti-
trust theories to strategic use because it involves an effort to punish
the lowering of prices-the very behavior that ordinarily counts as a
virtue. To the extent that the literature on strategic misuse of the anti-
trust laws has focused on predatory pricing as a particular problem, it
has largely addressed the tendency of less efficient firms to seek the
creation of liability rules from the courts that would shelter them from
competing with more efficient firms. 22 While strategic capture of le-
gal rulemaking by less efficient firms is a legitimate and serious con-
cern, it is one that can be addressed by ensuring transparency in the
judicial process and careful deliberation in establishing liability rules.
But even assuming that the courts applying these rules are able to
discern between legitimate competition and exclusionary behavior,
there remains the possibility that plaintiffs will attempt to misuse pred-
atory pricing law to increase prices above competitive levels. Even if
19 Only about ten to fifteen percent of federal district court decisions are published in
the Westlaw database, which was searched to generate these statistics. See, e.g., William A.
Hilyerd, Using the Law Library: A Guide for Educators-Part I: Untangling the Legal System, 33
J.L. & EDUC. 213, 221 (2004) (citing Roy M. MERSKV & DONALDJ. DUNN, FUNDAMENTALS OF
LEGAL RESEARCH 23 (8th ed. 2002)). But it would not be safe to extrapolate from the fifty-
eight reported decisions that there have been 387 to 580 federal predatory pricing cases
filed since 1993. Antitrust cases, which often involve large potential liability and sophisti-
cated counsel, are likely to be reported disproportionately to many more mundane mat-
ters, such as prisoner pro se filings and federally backed student loan foreclosure actions.
Further, the ten- to fifteen-percent statistic concerns the number of decisions that are pub-
lished, not the total number of cases in which some written decision gets reported. A
particular case may involve multiple written decisions, some reported and some not.
20 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1984); Ed-
ward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The Competitor Plaintiff 90
MICH. L. REv. 551 (1991); R. Preston McAfee & Nicholas V. Vakkur, The Strategic Abuse of
the Antitrust Laws (Jan. 27, 2004) (working paper, on file with author), available at http://
dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.594581; see also Edward D. Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust Damages:
An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 61 TUL. L. REv. 777, 814-15 (1987) (discussing the filing of
frivolous antitrust lawsuits to influence risk-averse corporate managers). See generally THE
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST (Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shughart II
eds., 1995) (proposing that plaintiffs have systematically misused antitrust law for rent-
seeking purposes).
21 See, e.g., William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competi-
tion, 28J.L. & ECON. 247 (1985); Snyder & Kauper, supra note 20.
22 See, e.g., Baumol & Ordover, supra note 21, at 255 ( "[Less efficient firms] advocate
their costing approach as a device to limit the price-cutting opportunities of rivals ren-
dered more efficient by economies of scale or scope, by superior management, or by other
legitimate sources of superiority.").
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the content of the law is optimally specified, the opportunity for abuse
through predatory pricing litigation does not vanish. This Part con-
siders the ways in which plaintiffs may use predatory pricing litigation,
or the threat of litigation, to diminish price competition, even in cases
where predation is unlikely to have taken place and the courts are
unlikely to conclude erroneously that it has.
A. The Availability of Strategic Predatory Pricing Claims
Firms strategically misuse predatory pricing law in two ways. In
the first model, a less efficient rival might use a predation lawsuit to
raise its rival's costs or threaten the possibility of a large money judg-
ment in order to overcome an efficiency deficit. In the second model,
a firm might use a predation lawsuit to send price signals, exchange
information, and otherwise facilitate the formation or maintenance of
a consciously parallel pricing scheme. A strategically thinking firm
need not adopt only one model because elements of both could be
used simultaneously to discourage price competition.
1. Overcoming a Rival's Efficiency Advantages
If a predatory pricing lawsuit is so unlikely to succeed in light of
the substantial hurdles created by Matsushita and Brooke Group, then
defendants might not allow the threat of such litigation to affect their
market behavior. However, the mere fact that a lawsuit is unlikely to
succeed is only one factor in the defendant's pricing calculus. Equally
important are such factors as the cost and aggravation of litigating,
and the magnitude of the plaintiff's recovery in the unlikely event that
the plaintiff obtains a favorable verdict or advances far enough in the
litigation to exact a settlement.
a. Raising a Rival's Costs Through Predatory Pricing Litigation
A common focal point in predatory pricing litigation and scholar-
ship is the relative productive efficiencies of the alleged predator and
prey.23 If the prey is less efficient than the predator, the predator may
be able to exclude the prey from the market by pricing above its own
cost but below the prey's. Although this view is not universal, 24 most
judicial opinions and commentators agree that any competitor ex-
23 See, e.g., George A. Hay, A Confused Lauyer's Guide to the Predatory Pricing Literature, in
STRATEGY, PREDATION, AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 155, 160-61 (S. Salop ed. 1981) (discussing
how a dominant firm's pricing behavior reflects its relative productive efficiency).
24 SeeLePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 177 (3d Cir. 2003) (Greenberg, J., dissenting)
(discussing plaintiff corporation's successful argument that it did not need to show that it
was as efficient as defendant corporation in the production of transparent tape in order to
challenge defendant's bundled discounts and rebates as exclusionary); cf Edlin, supra note
8, at 945-46 (proposing a "dynamic" standard for adjudicating predation that would pre-
vent a monopoly from responding to a new entrant with "substantial price cuts or signifi-
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cluded from a market because of its inferior efficiency has no com-
plaint under the antitrust laws. 25  The usual discussion on the
comparative efficiency of market rivals in predatory pricing cases as-
sumes that each firm brings to the market whatever productive effi-
ciency it has attained on its own. But firms can also affect one
another's efficiency, incidentally26 or deliberately. 27 When an effi-
ciency gap exists between rival firms, predatory pricing law may enable
the less efficient firm to coerce its rival to price in a manner consistent
with the less efficient firm's productive limitations.28
Suppose that a new entrant is less efficient than the dominant
incumbent. In response, the incumbent may drop its price, thus
threatening the new entrant's survival. To counter, the new entrant
may threaten to file a predatory pricing suit, or actually file one, to
force the incumbent to soften its price cutting. The incumbent might
reasonably anticipate that whatever profits it would forgo by raising its
price, thus yielding market share to the new entrant and acquiescing
to the threatened predatory pricing suit, would be more than offset by
the savings in litigation expenses. Therefore, the incumbent might
increase its price to appease its litigious rival.
Firms, of course, prefer not to face the cost of litigation. The
mere threat of predatory pricing litigation, however, may not be suffi-
cient to persuade the incumbent firm to increase its price. In order
cant product enhancements until the entrant has had a reasonable time to . . . become
viable").
25 See, e.g., Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355, 1363 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that a
predatory pricing plaintiff must show that defendant's price would have excluded an
equally efficient competitor); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232
(1st Cir. 1983) (discussing the harmful effect of sub-marginal cost pricing on equally effi-
cient competitors); MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1113 (7th
Cir. 1983) (discussing the view that price cuts by dominant firms are incapable of exclud-
ing equally efficient firms, so long as prices remain above costs); RicHARD A. POSNER, ANTI-
TRUST LAW 215 (2d ed. 2001) (arguing that above-cost pricing should not be unlawful
because it cannot exclude an equally efficient competitor); Phillip Areeda & Donald F.
Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L.
REV. 697, 709-10 (1975) (proposing predation rules with the goal of protecting equally
efficient competitors); Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts To Drive Out Entrants Are Not
Predatory-and the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power, 112 YALE LJ. 681, 711-14
(2003) (analyzing what sort of price cuts are capable of driving out equally efficient firms).
26 See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 25, at 687 (explaining how a new entrant can decrease
an incumbent's efficiency by cherry picking the most profitable business, thereby under-
mining the incumbent's efficient price-discrimination scheme).
27 See, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Rais-
ing Rivals'Costs To Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 223-24 (1986); Steven C. Salop
& David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PRoc.) 267
(1983). On predatory litigation generally, see Gary Myers, Litigation as a Predatory Practice,
80 Ky. L.J. 565 (1992).
28 See Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE
L.J. 284, 287 (1977) (noting that predatory pricing law could be invoked as a "shelter
against inefficiency").
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for the threat to be credible, the incumbent must believe that the
predatory pricing lawsuit would cost it more than it would cost the
new entrant, even if the incumbent believes that the suit would be
unlikely to succeed. 29 Otherwise, there would be no obvious advan-
tage for the new entrant to file suit because it would harm the new
entrant as much as the incumbent.30 The incumbent firm must gen-
erally believe then that the incumbent will pay substantially more to
defend the lawsuit than the plaintiff will to prosecute it. For at least
four reasons the incumbent might reasonably believe that this is so.
First, the incumbent's loss aversion may exceed the new entrant's
gain preference because of the "endowment effect"-the propensity
of firms to disfavor losses more than they favor equivalent gains.31 If
so, the incumbent might be willing to spend more to avoid an adverse
judgment than the new entrant would spend to obtain a favorable
one. Facing the prospect of a predatory pricing lawsuit, the incum-
bent might reasonably conclude that its own defense costs would far
exceed the new entrant's prosecution costs. The defendant would
therefore have reason to believe that the plaintiff would be willing to
prosecute a predatory pricing lawsuit as a means of increasing defen-
dant's costs. To avoid such a nuisance suit, the incumbent firm might
be induced to soften its price competition, thus enabling the new en-
trant to overcome the incumbent's efficiency advantage. 32
Second, and in a similar vein, the incumbent firm may have
reputational reasons, not shared by plaintiffs, that strengthen its aver-
sion to losing antitrust lawsuits. The management team responsible
for conduct leading to an adverse judgment or a substantial settle-
ment may fear stigmatization, or a loss of shareholder or customer
confidence. While the reputational spillover effects in antitrust cases
29 See generally Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 27 (discussing exclusionary restraints
and the effectiveness of raising rivals' costs as a method of anticompetitive exclusion).
30 A threat by the new entrant to raise both firms' costs by an equal amount could
potentially be credible if the new entrant had greater or cheaper access to capital than the
incumbent. This is putting aside, of course, the possibility that the new entrant would actu-
ally prevail and recover a substantial judgment, which is discussed in the next section.
31 See Daniel Kahneman,Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 211, 213 (Cass
R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J.
EcoN. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 43-47 (1980).
32 Differences between the plaintiffs and defendant's preferences with respect to
losses and gains may not only affect the amount of each side's litigation expenditures but
also the dynamics of settlement negotiations. If the defendant's aversion to large losses
exceeds the plaintiff's preference for large gains, the likelihood increases that the defen-
dant would be willing to make a larger settlement payment to avoid the risk of a substantial
adverse judgment in a predatory pricing case. This could increase the attraction of preda-
tory pricing litigation as a strategic threat by plaintiffs to coerce defendants to lessen price
competition.
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may be weak compared to other categories of corporate crime, 33 they
are likely to be stronger for the defendant than for the plaintiff.34
Management teams that instigate frivolous, costly, and ultimately un-
successful litigation may pay a reputational price, but probably a lower
one than executives tagged with violations of the antitrust laws, which
are, after all, criminal statutes. Therefore, faced with the threat of a
predatory pricing lawsuit, the incumbent firm may elect to increase its
prices to appease the new entrant, rather than exploit its efficiency
advantage by underpricing its competitors.
Third, plaintiffs may be able to hire lawyers on contingency, thus
shifting the risks of litigation failures onto a third party,35 whereas the
defendant must bear the litigation costs on an hourly-fee basis, regard-
less of the outcome. The contingency-fee structure can induce the
plaintiff to see only an upside to initiating a predatory pricing law-
suit.3 6 Of course, to the extent that the plaintiffs objective in bring-
ing such a lawsuit is to force an abatement of price competition rather
than to achieve a favorable money judgment or settlement, it is less
likely that the plaintiff would be able to find a law firm agreeable to
taking the matter on contingency. Contingency-fee lawyers must be
convinced that the lawsuit may bring a monetary benefit to them and
not merely a strategic benefit to their client. But, at least where the
plaintiff has some hope of exacting a settlement from the defendant,
the defendant has reason to believe that its own litigation expenses
will be substantial regardless of the outcome, whereas the plaintiff
may pay no out-of-pocket fees at all. As will be discussed in Part I.B, a
survey of plaintiffs' lawyers in recent predatory pricing cases reveals
that despite Brooke Group and other decisions hostile to predatory pric-
ing cases, some firms continue to take predatory pricing cases on
contingency.
3 See Cindy R. Alexander, On the Nature of the Reputational Penalty for Corporate Crime:
Evidence, 42 J.L. & EcoN. 489 (1999) (reporting that firms convicted of anticompetitive
collusion paid a relatively small reputational price).
34 Cf Kenneth D. Garbade et al., Market Reaction to the Filing ofAntitrust Suits: An Aggre-
gate and Cross-Sectional Analysis, 64 REv. ECON. & STAT. 686, 691 (1982) (finding that the
stock of companies named as defendants in antitrust actions by the Department of Justice
or Federal Trade Commission experience significant negative returns immediately after
the announcement of the governmental action).
35 See Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51
DUKE L.J. 1251, 1300 n.182 (2002); Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychologi-
cal Theory, 67 U. CHi. L. REv. 163, 207 n. 203 (2000) (citing Murray L. Schwartz & Daniel
J.B. Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, 22 STAN.
L. REV. 1125, 1125 (1970)); Keith N. Hylton, Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation Under
Strict Liability, 4 AM. L. & EcoN. REv. 18, 37 (2002).
36 See generally Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Contingency Fees, Settlement Delay,
and Low-Quality Litigation: Empirical Evidence from Two Datasets, 19 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 517
(2003) (reporting that the contingency-fee structure tends to increase legal quality and
decrease the time to settlement, while the hourly-fee structure tends to encourage the
filing of low-quality, "frivolous" litigation and increase the time to settlement).
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Finally, as Frank Easterbrook has argued, antitrust litigation may
create an "asymmetrical structure of incentives" favoring plaintiffs, be-
cause a plaintiffs litigation costs, and in particular, discovery costs, are
likely to be less than the defendant's. 3 7 Because "[tihe defendant is
apt to be larger, with more files to search, and to have control of more
pertinent documents than the plaintiff,"38 the defendant may pre-
sume that the threatened lawsuit will be more costly to itself than to
the new entrant.
A plaintiffs predatory pricing case need not be successful, or
even very likely to succeed, in order to teach efficient producers that
price temperance, rather than price aggression, is the more profitable
route. Rather, simply forcing the incumbent to endure the costly
predatory pricing suit may be enough. Further, the new entrant may
not need to file suit to chill price competition; a credible threat of
litigation may be sufficient to achieve the desired result. If the incum-
bent anticipates that any predatory pricing lawsuit filed by the new
entrant would impose greater costs on the incumbent than on the
new entrant, the incumbent will believe that the new entrant has the
power to raise the incumbent's costs by filing a predatory pricing law-
suit. If the new entrant threatens litigation, the incumbent may un-
derstand that threat as one that can realistically raise its costs, but
which can be avoided by easing on price competition. As described,
predatory pricing may be an effective strategic tool for less efficient
firms to erase a more efficient rival's productive advantage. Moreover,
the threat of such litigation, explicit or implicit, may work regardless
of whether the new litigation would actually raise the incumbent's
costs. Ultimately, what counts is not that the incumbent's costs are
actually raised, but that the incumbent believes that its costs would be
raised if it continued to engage in vigorous price competition.
b. Exploiting the Magnitude of Recoverable Damages
In the wake of Brooke Group and Matsushita, plaintiffs find it diffi-
cult to win predatory pricing lawsuits, but there remains a pot of gold
awaiting any plaintiff that does win. Evaluating the expected cost of a
predatory pricing lawsuit requires examining not only the ex ante
probability of an adverse judgment, which may be quite low, but also
the magnitude of the recoverable damages in the unlikely event of a
plaintiffs verdict. Whenever attained, the plaintiff's damages in pred-
atory pricing cases are likely to be quite high, which creates a signifi-
cant expected liability for defendants, even if a finding of liability is
unlikely. 39
37 See Easterbrook, supra note 20, at 34.
38 See id.
39 See, e.g., infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
2005]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Once ajury finds the defendant liable for predatory pricing, prov-
ing damages is typically not difficult. The tendency of courts in anti-
trust cases is to require strict proof of causation and antitrust injury,
but much more lenient proof of the amount of damages once those
elements are established. 40 This tendency has significant systemic ef-
fects in predatory pricing cases. A firm's aggressive price competition,
whether predatory or innocent, almost inevitably causes damage to
competitors by lowering their market share and profit margins. While
the antitrust laws presume that most such effects are damnum absque
injuia-harrn without legal injury-when a plaintiff proves legal in-
jury in a predatory pricing case, proving damages resulting from the
predation is relatively easy. Even new market entrants who have not
yet established a profitable business can claim that predatory pricing
has excluded them from the market and may establish damages by
relying on estimates of lost profits. 4 1 Proving the amount of lost prof-
its but for the incumbent's predatory pricing scheme is, to put it
mildly, "not a straightforward matter. ' 42 Ascertaining this "but-for"
world requires the showing of the but-for market price, plaintiff's but-
for market share, and plaintiffs profitability at the but-for price and
market share. 43 Nevertheless, the difficulty of assessing damages can
work to the benefit of the plaintiff, because the cost of any uncertainty
regarding the plaintiffs but-for profits is borne by the guilty defen-
dant, rather than by the innocent plaintiff.44
40 SeeJ. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 566 (1981) (holding
that some uncertainty in proving damages in antitrust cases must be tolerated because
"[t] he vagaries of the marketplace usually deny us sure knowledge of what plaintiff s situa-
tion would have been in the absence of the defendant's antitrust violation"); Story Parch-
ment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1931) ("It is true that
there was uncertainty as to the extent of the damage, but there was none as to the fact of
the damage; and there is a clear distinction between the measure of proof necessary to
establish the fact that petitioner had sustained some damage, and the measure of proof
necessary to enable the jury to fix the amount.... Where the [wrongful act] itself is of such
a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the amount of damages with certainty, it
would be a perversion of fundamental principles ofjustice to deny all relief to the injured
person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend for his acts.... [T]he
risk of the uncertainty should be thrown upon the wrongdoer instead of upon the injured
party."); Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy and Monopsony, 76 CORNELL L.
REv. 297, 338 n.221 (1991) ("Traditionally, courts have been lenient about the degree of
certainty required to prove the amount of damages in an antitrust case."); Jeffrey L. Harri-
son, The Lost Profits Measure of Damages in Price Enhancement Cases, 64 MINN. L. REv. 751,
756-58 (1980) (discussing the relaxed requirements for proving the amount of damages
once an antitrust injury is shown).
41 See 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ROGER D. BLAIR & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw:
AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION I 3 9 6g (2000) (discussing
the complexity of determining damages in predatory pricing cases because the market
conditions but-for the defendant's actions must be estimated).
42 See id.
43 See id.
44 See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265-66 (1946).
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While the jury is deliberating on what damages to award the
plaintiff in light of the uncertainty created by defendant's conduct, it
is usually unaware that the damages are automatically trebled 45 and
that the prevailing plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees from the de-
fendant, whereas there is no such recovery for a triumphant defen-
dant.46 Further, the conduct that gives rise to predatory pricing
claims-aggressive price competition-might be easily misinterpreted
by naive jurors as malicious and thus deserving of punishment. A de-
fendant's internal documents are often laced with aggressive or vio-
lent metaphors that sound shocking to jurors unfamiliar with the
business world.47 Observing market competition is often like going to
a sausage factory-ugly when observed in intimate detail, even if it
produces desirable results. Seeing the inner workings of an aggressive
pricing campaign by a "big company" against a smaller new entrant
may inflame jurors into awarding large damages. 48 Historically, jury
awards in predatory pricing cases have been disproportionately large,
requiring remittitur by the courts. 49
Predatory pricing claims thus present a "perfect storm" of factors
favorable to plaintiffs in the event that liability is established-straight-
forward proof that damages were suffered, leniency with respect to
proving the amount of damages, automatic trebling and fee shifting,
and facts bearing negatively on defendants. Unsurprisingly, plaintiffs
jury awards in predatory pricing cases are often enormous. 50 MCI
won a jury verdict against AT&T that, with trebling, would have
amounted to a $1.8 billion judgment in 1980 dollars.51 Predation jury
verdicts can be large not only in absolute terms but, more impor-
tantly, in relation to the defendant's income stream. For example, the
45 See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000). For cases holding that juries are not to be informed that
damages will be trebled pursuant to statute, see HBE Leasing Corp. v. Frank, 22 F.3d 41,
45-46 (2d Cir. 1994); Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934, 955 (5th Cir.
1975); Semke v. Enid Auto. Dealers Assn, 456 F.2d 1361, 1370 (10th Cir. 1972). See also
ThomasJ. Goger, Annotation, Instructions or Remarks toJuy, in Civil Antitrust Action Under 15
U.S.C.A. § 15, that Any Damages It Awards Will Be Trebled, 28 A.L.R. Fed. 610 (2004) (discuss-
ing major lines of cases on this issue).
46 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
47 See A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th Cir.
1989) (describing tendency of plaintiff's lawyers in predatory pricing cases to "rummage
through business records" for evidence of a "greed-driven desire to succeed and glee at a
rival's predicament," which "invites juries to penalize hard competition"); POSNER, supra
note 25, at 214-15 (describing tendency ofjudges and juries to misinterpret "metaphors of
coercion that are compelling evidence of predatory intent to the naive").
48 See infra text accompanying notes 207-09.
49 See Bolton et al., supra note 8, at 2254-55 (noting that before the current wave of
defendant-friendly predatory pricing precedents, juries often awarded disproportionately
large amounts in predatory pricing cases).
50 Id.
51 MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1092 (7th Cir. 1983).
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Kinetic Conceptsjury verdict of $173.6 million 52 would have amounted
to a $520.8 million judgment after trebling, exclusive of interest or
attorney's fees. 53 To put that in perspective, defendant Hillenbrand
Industries' net income in the year preceding the judgment was $153
million-less than a third of the amount of the judgment. 54 Largely
due to the $250 million settlement resulting from that judgment, Hil-
lenbrand's net income fell to $44 million the following year. 55
In light of the sheer magnitude of potential damages in predatory
pricing cases-indeed, many predatory pricing lawsuits are so-called
bet-the-company events-it is not surprising that defendants continue
to pay out substantial sums to settle predatory pricing lawsuits, despite
two decades of precedents favoring defendants. In recent years, settle-
ments of $250 million, 56 $65 million, 57 $36 million, 58 and $6.5 mil-
lion,59 have been reported in predatory pricing cases despite the
prodefendant influence of Matsushita and Brooke Group. Faced with
the prospect of such litigation and potentially ruinous economic con-
sequences, it would not be surprising if many firms chose to retreat
rather than to continue to engage in aggressive price competition.
2. Facilitating Oligopolistic Pricing Through Price Signaling,
Information Exchange, and Judicial Policing
The previous section described the ways in which a firm might
use the threat of a predatory pricing suit to overcome an efficiency
deficit and coerce another firm to soften its price competition. To be
successful, such a strategy requires that one firm force a second firm
to abandon an otherwise more profitable pricing strategy in order to
avoid costly litigation. Threats of predatory pricing litigation may also
be strategically used without threatening to increase the other firm's
costs or coercing the other firm to abandon a more profitable pricing
scheme. Threats of predatory pricing litigation, or litigation itself,
52 Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Hillenbrand Indus., Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 722, 725-26
(W.D. Tex. 2003).
53 The case was settled before an appeal was taken. See id.
54 See Hillenbrand Indus., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 15 (Jan. 6, 2003).
55 Id. at 19-20.
56 See Kinetic Concepts, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 724.
57 Brunswick to Settle Pricing Suits for $65 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1999, at C4 ("The
Brunswick Corporation said yesterday that it had agreed to pay $65 million to settle two
class-action suits in which boat builders accused it of using predatory pricing to drive com-
petitors out of business.").
58 Harlan S. Byrne, In a Real Fix, BARRON'S, Oct. 2, 1995, at 16, 16 (reporting that after
a state court awarded Thermex Energy $488 million for damages in a predatory pricing
suit against Dyno Industries and ICI Explosives, ICI settled for $36 million and Dyno set-
tled "on undisclosed terms").
59 Vicki Vaughan, Family Feud-Centeno Heirs Battle to Control Ruins of Bankrupt Grocery
Chain, SAN AN TONIo EXPRESS-NEWS, June 2, 1996, at 1J (reporting that regional grocery
store H-E-B Co. paid Centeno Super Markets $6.5 million to settle predatory pricing suit).
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may be an ideal tool to create the necessary conditions for tacit price
collusion among oligopolists, a market condition that could increase
the profits of both the threatening and the threatened firm, to the
detriment of consumers.
Tacit collusion among oligopolists, or even conscious parallel-
ism-its weaker form-is a perennial concern in antitrust law. 60 Coor-
dinated pricing effects are the primary reason that the government
challenges mergers in concentrated industries, particularly where
goods are homogenous and barriers to entry are high.6' But, even in
such markets, there are often significant impediments to parallel pric-
ing that render "[t]his anticompetitive minuet . . . most difficult to
compose and to perform. '62 Uncertainty over competitors' pricing
and output levels prevents multilateral price parallelism, and cheating
on the cartel-or suspicion that others will cheat-foments a break-
down of pricing discipline. 63 Threats of predatory pricing litigation
and actual litigation may help solve these collective action problems
by signaling pricing levels, facilitating information exchange, and pro-
viding state-sanctioned cartel policing.
The most immediate competitive effect of a predatory pricing
complaint may be to send price signals to competitors by providing a
detailed specification of the plaintiffs objections to the defendant's
present pricing structure. Price signaling is of concern in oligopolistic
markets because information about a competitor's pricing intentions
helps eliminate the uncertainty that should drive firms to price at
cost.64 Although there are many less expensive ways of signaling
60 See generally Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Con-
scious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REv. 655 (1962) (discussing potential
antitrust conduct among parties, even in the absence of an explicit agreement).
61 See Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1386 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.)
("When an economic approach is taken in a section 7 [Clayton Act] case, the ultimate
issue is whether the challenged acquisition is likely to facilitate collusion."); FI'C v. Arch
Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 131 (D.D.C. 2004) (noting that "antitrust policy seeks
particularly to inhibit 'the creation or reinforcement by merger of... oligopolistic market
structures in which tacit coordination can occur"') (alteration in original) (quoting FTC v.
J.H. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2001); 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57
Fed. Reg. 41,552, 41,558 (issued Apr. 2, 1992) (discussing the theory of coordinated inter-
action among oligopolists resulting from an increase in market concentration).
62 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 228
(1993).
63 Even overt cartels are known to face policing difficulties, as was shown in two em-
pirical studies of the Joint Executive Committee, an 1880s U.S. railroad cartel. See Glenn
Ellison, Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee, 25 RAND J. ECON. 37,
37-38 (1994) (noting that the cartel suffered occasional price wars); Robert H. Porter, A
Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886, 14 BELL J. ECON. 301,
312-13 (1983) (noting "reversions to noncooperative behavior . . . with a significant de-
crease in market price in these periods").
64 See generally Michael D. Blechman, Conscious Parallelism, Signalling and Facilitating
Devices: The Problem of Tacit Collusion Under the Antitrust Laws, 24 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 881, 882
(1979) (discussing this concern); Joseph Kattan, Beyond Facilitating Practices: Price Signaling
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prices other than filing a predatory pricing complaint, some methods
are illegal, 65 while others lack the specificity and detail of a predatory
pricing complaint. The predatory pricing complaint provides a vehi-
cle for identifying specific pricing decisions that are objectionable,
itemizing customer contracts or promotions that are allegedly an-
ticompetitive, specifying what an appropriate price would be, and
even making allegations about defendant's intentions with respect to
ongoing or future pricing that permit inferences about plaintiffs own
planning. For example, Beech-Nut's 2001 predatory pricing com-
plaint against Gerber contains detailed allegations about supposedly
predatory bids that occurred a few months before the complaint, in-
cluding allegations about Gerber's and Beech-Nut's respective bids
and Beech-Nut's variable cost for infant cereal, and makes allegations
with respect to Gerber's future planned pricing and promotional
activity.66
Discovery in litigation may also provide valuable information
about prices, costs, customers, contractual structures, output manage-
ment, executive compensation, and many other varieties of competi-
tive data. Cost and revenue data, in particular, play a prominent role
in predatory pricing litigation since a threshold question is whether
defendant's revenues exceeded its costs. 67 Defendants are also enti-
fled to data about plaintiff's costs and revenues, since whether the
plaintiff is an equally efficient competitor rendered unable to com-
pete by defendant's prices is a material question in the litigation. 68
Predatory pricing discovery thus becomes a clearinghouse for the very
type of information sharing that in other contexts is itself an antitrust
violation because of its tendency to facilitate parallel pricing.69
and Price Protection Clauses in the New Antitrust Environment, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 133 (1994)
(same); Lionel Kestenbaum, What Is "Price Signalling" and Does It Violate the Law?, 49 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 911 (1980) (same).
65 See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Regulating Oligopoly Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws, 89
MINN. L. REv. 9, 59 n.203 (2004) (collecting cases where the Federal Trade Commission
charged that price signaling was an illegal facilitating practice under section 5 of the FTC
Act).
66 Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief, Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp. v. Gerber
Prods. Co., No. CIV-S-01-1920 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2001) (on file with author).
67 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222 ("First, a plaintiff seeking to establish competitive
injury resulting from a rival's low prices must prove that the prices complained of are
below an appropriate measure of its rival's costs.").
68 See supra note 25.
69 See United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969) (holding that an
informal arrangement among corrugated container manufacturers to share bid informa-
tion on specific customer contracts was sufficient to find an unlawful restraint of trade);
Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 411-12 (1921) (affirming the
district court's finding that a manufacturers' association information-sharing plan was an
unlawful restraint of trade that contributed to a significant decrease in production and
increase in prices); Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that em-
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Admittedly, litigation is not the ideal tool for oligopolistic infor-
mation sharing because the events at issue often involve past pricing
and discovery may be limited to historical prices, excluding present or
future prices.70 Information on present or future pricing plans is gen-
erally more useful than stale, historical information in facilitating par-
allel pricing.7 However, some predatory pricing plaintiffs allege
ongoing violations and request injunctive relief; consequently, discov-
ery may involve exchanges of information about present and future
pricing. 72 Further, even if the price information exchanged is stale,
simply exchanging reciprocal details about cost structures may facili-
tate anticompetitive pricing decisions. 73 Protective orders limiting ac-
cess to documents and deposition testimony to the lawyers
representing the parties may prevent information sharing, but there is
no guarantee that such orders will be granted or adequately en-
forced.74 It is virtually impossible to ensure that business executives
involved in pricing decisions for the litigating parties will remain una-
ware of the key pricing issues in the litigation when such matters are
ployee-plaintiff stated a cause of action where employer-defendants allegedly agreed to
exchange information about employee compensation).
70 It is also the case, of course, that in litigation one party to the information ex-
change is an unwilling party. Litigation involves coerced information exchange, but it is
not necessarily surprising that one party would need to coerce its rival to do something
that could ultimately benefit both firms. The dominant firm may have disincentives to
share information with a rival. See Amitai Aviram & Avishalom Tor, Overcoming Impediments
to Information Sharing, 55 ALA. L. REV. 231, 245-47 (2004).
71 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978) ("Exchanges of
current price information, of course, have the greatest potential for generating anticompe-
titive effects and although not per se unlawful have consistently been held to violate the
Sherman Act.").
72 See, e.g., T.W.A.R., Inc. v. Pac. Bell, 145 F.R.D. 105, 108 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (compel-
ling defendant to produce contemporaneous business documents where plaintiff argued
that such documents were relevant to its claim for injunctive relief in predatory pricing
case). But see Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Ad. Richfield Co., 133 F.R.D. 41 (D. Nev. 1990) (limit-
ing discovery to facts concerning barriers to entry and not permitting discovery as to pric-
ing matters relevant to predatory pricing claims until plaintiff established the existence of
barriers to entry).
73 See Fed. Trade Comm'n & U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collabora-
tions Among Competitors § 3.34(e) (2000) (expressing concern over information sharing
as to competitor's "input requirements").
74 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law, 109 YALE
L.J. 1885, 1923 (2000) (arguing that protective orders do not fully ensure secrecy between
contractual parties because "the lawyers who see the information subject to these orders
may well play a role in subsequent negotiations between the disputing parties" and observ-
ing a need for more predictable procedural rules for such agreements); Daniel A. Crane,
Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and Economic Implica-
tions, 54 FLA. L. REv. 747, 759 (2002) (arguing that protective orders are insufficient to
protect against anticompetitive information exchange in discovery between horizontal
competitors); Alan Lawrence, The Value of Copyright Law as a Deterrent to Discovery Abuse, 138
U. PA. L. REv. 549, 565-66 (1989) (arguing that protective orders are "highly unreliable"
for the protection of trade secrets because they may be "subject to modification or com-
plete withdrawal by the courts" and breaches are difficult to police and punish).
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raised at summary judgment, or at trial, or are ultimately disclosed in
judicial opinions. Thus, despite its limitations as an information-shar-
ing device, predatory pricing litigation virtually guarantees the flow of
an unhealthy amount of sensitive business information between hori-
zontal competitors.
Predatory pricing plaintiffs may also hope to involve the courts in
policing a supracompetitive pricing structure. Predatory pricing suits
often last many years and trial judges may become involved in scruti-
nizing the parties' pricing behavior during the pendency of the litiga-
tion. Preliminary injunctions ordering the defendant not to price
below certain levels pending trial are the strongest form of judicial
policing and have been ordered in predatory pricing cases. 75 Even if
the plaintiff ultimately loses the predatory pricing lawsuit at trial or on
appeal, the plaintiff may have realized significant pricing benefits in
the interim. Milder forms of policing, short of direct judicial coer-
cion, are also possible. Plaintiffs may raise defendant's ongoing pric-
ing behavior in motions, briefs, or hearings, hoping to elicit
cautionary comments from the court.
To be sure, predatory pricing litigation is an expensive way of
sending pricing signals, collecting information on a competitor's cost
structure or business plans, or organizing a cartel. As discussed fur-
ther in Part I.B, predatory pricing litigation, even for a plaintiff, is
extremely costly. But a plaintiff need not incur all of the costs neces-
sary to take a predatory pricing case through trial and appeal to real-
ize the market benefits of the suit. Price signaling, information
exchange, and judicial involvement in price setting may all occur
fairly early in the litigation before the larger portion of the costs are
incurred. If the case survives summary judgment and heads for trial-
the most costly portion of the case-the likelihood of nonstrategic
benefits to the plaintiff-either a settlement or money judgment-
increases significantly, thus justifying the expenditure of more money
on litigation. The structure of predatory pricing litigation permits
plaintiffs to make an initial limited investment in the lawsuit that may
bring benefits in the market regardless of the ultimate outcome. If
the litigation survives threshold motions, plaintiffs then invest greater
sums and the likelihood of a favorable monetary outcome increases.
In sum, predatory pricing litigation provides opportunities for
oligopolists to call a truce in a price war and exchange sufficient pric-
75 See, e.g., Am. Bldg. Prods., L.L.C. v. Ashley Aluminum, Inc., No. CIV.A. 97-2976,
1997 WL 610877, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 1, 1997) (ordering defendant to return its prices to
August 1, 1997 levels, with allowance only for fluctuation in raw materials markets, pending
final adjudication of case); Advantage Publ'ns, Inc. v. Daily Press, Inc., No. 83-72-NN, 1983
WL 1829, at *9 (E.D. Va. May 23, 1983) (ordering defendant to hold its advertising rates at
specified levels, without "discounts, bonuses, rebates, pick-ups, tie-ins or any other arrange-
ment with advertisers," pending final adjudication of case).
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ing signals and information to facilitate consciously parallel pricing.
Not surprisingly, claims of predatory pricing and claims of oligopolis-
tic collusion often arise simultaneously in concentrated markets. The
typical scenario in such situations involves a dominant firm using
predatory pricing to discipline an unwilling cartelist.76 An overlooked
possibility is that the predatory pricing lawsuit is being used to organ-
ize the cartel. Two examples of well-known predatory pricing lawsuits
illustrate how predation litigation could be used to facilitate oligopoly
pricing.
a. Airlines
Since deregulation in 1978,7 7 several high-profile charges of
oligopolistic collusion have been filed against the airline industry. A
well-known episode of attempted price-fixing involved a 1982 price
war between American Airlines and Braniff. The Department of Jus-
tice obtained a tape recording of a conversation between Robert Cran-
dall, president of American, and Howard Putnam, president of
Braniff, in which Crandall encouraged Putnam to raise prices by
twenty percent.78 In 1992, the Department of Justice sued Alaska Air-
lines, American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, TWA, United, and
USAir, alleging that they had engaged in price signaling by dissemi-
nating future price information in a variety of ways. 79 The case ended
in a consent decree whereby the airlines agreed to cease a number of
the challenged practices.8 0 In 2004, the Department of Justice filed a
show cause petition alleging that American had violated the consent
decree by publishing future first travel dates, apparently in order to
signal price increases to competitors.8'
At the same time that the airline industry has ostensibly been a
hotbed of oligopolistic cooperation to price at supracompetitive
levels, some airlines also have allegedly been engaged in predatory
pricing. 82 American has faced predatory pricing claims by Continen-
76 See Bolton et al., supra note 8, at 2267-68; Edlin, supra note 8, at 961; Hovenkamp,
supra note 11, at 316.
77 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
78 United States v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d 1114, 1116 (5th Cir. 1984) (reporting
transcript of Crandall-Putnam call).
79 Complaint at 9-11, United States v. Airline Tariff Publ'g Co., 1994-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 70,687 (D.D.C. 1994) (No. 92-2854), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f4700/
4796.pdf.
80 Airline Tariff Publ'g, 1994-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 72,717-20.
81 Petition of the Un':ed States for an Order to Show Cause Why Respondent Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc. Should Not Be Found in Civil Contempt at 3-4, No. 92-2854 (D.D.C.
Aug. 6, 2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f204900/204943.pdf.
82 See generally Stephan P. Brady & William A. Cunningham, Exploring Predatory Pricing
in the Airline Industry, TRANSP. J., Fall 2001, at 5 (examining charges of predatory pricing in
the airline industry since deregulation).
2005]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
tal and Northwest in 199283 and the Justice Department in 1999.84
Virgin Atlantic sued British Airways on what amounted to predatory
pricing charges in 1993.85 Other postderegulation predation suits in-
clude Laker against Sabena and KLM in 198386 and Laker against
PanAm in 1985.87 Further, several low-cost carriers have reportedly
complained to the Department of Transportation about predatory
pricing by larger airlines, including Valujet against Delta, Frontier
against United, and Reno Air against Northwest. 88
What is interesting about the airline cases is that at least one of
the alleged dates of predatory pricing corresponded with a period in
which the predator and prey were supposedly engaged in oligopolistic
collusion. The Government's 1992 price signaling case against Ameri-
can, Continental, Northwest, and others, concerned the same time pe-
riod as American's alleged predatory pricing campaign against
Continental and Northwest. 89 For both of these allegations to be true,
American would had to have been predating against Contintental and
Northwest at the same time as it was colluding with them. Although a
predatory pricing campaign to discipline rivals into collusion may
have been plausible,90 the Justice Department charged that American,
Continental, and Northwest were already colluding at the time that
Continental and Northwest alleged that American launched its new,
allegedly predatory pricing scheme. American cannot have been both
predating against and colluding with the same competitors at the
same moment, since predation involves pricing below cost and collu-
sion involves pricing at supracompetitive levels.9 1
83 Cont'l Airlines, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 1993-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,334, at
70,752 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
84 United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1111 (10th Cir. 2003).
85 Virgin Ad. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 256, 259 (2d Cir. 2001).
86 Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.D.C. 1984).
87 Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 607 F. Supp. 324, 325 (S.D.N.Y.
1985). It is unlikely that either of the Laker actions involved strategic use of predatory
pricing law, since Laker was in liquidation in the United Kingdom at the time of the ac-
tions. See id. ("On February 5, 1982 Laker ceased doing business, due to insolvency, and on
February 17, 1982, an individual residing in the United Kingdom was appointed
Liquidator.").
88 SeeJames L. Gattuso, Don't Outlaw Cheap Airfares, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1998, at S5.
89 The Government's complaint alleged that the "Coordination Facilitating Device"
that enabled oligopoly pricing began in April of 1988 and continued to the date of the
Complaint, December 21, 1992. See Complaint, supra note 79, at 10. American's alleged
act of predatory pricing was its Value Pricing plan, announced on April 9, 1992. See Cont'l
Airlines, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 689, 692 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
90 See supra notes 63, 76 and accompanying text.
91 It is theoretically possible that American was colluding with Northwest and Conti-
nental on some routes and trying to drive them from other routes through predation, but
that possibility seems to be factually foreclosed since American's Value Pricing plan was a
general restructuring of its fare system across all routes. See Cont'l Airlines, 824 F. Supp. at
692-93.
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It is possible that one or both of the claims were mistaken-in-
deed, the jury found that American was not predating.9 2 It is also pos-
sible that the allegations of collusion were correct and that the
predatory pricing case itself reinforced a tacit collusive scheme.
Northwest and Continental may have facilitated a resumption of con-
sciously parallel, lockstep pricing by using the predatory pricing law-
suit as both a price signaling device and a punitive measure to raise
American's costs through litigation.
If so, the strategy seems to have worked. American announced
the challenged pricing plan on April 9, 199293 and other major carri-
ers quickly matched or beat American's price cut.94 Between April
and June, fares remained relatively flat. Then Continental filed its
predatory pricing lawsuit on June 9, 1992 and Northwest filed its par-
allel suit on June 12.95 Two weeks after filing suit, Northwest an-
nounced a ten percent price increase. 96 Continental matched
Northwest's increase and American followed shortly with its own 4.4%
price increase. 97 Thus began a pattern of price increases by the major
airlines that lasted until the end of the year.98 Between July and the
end of the year, while the predatory pricing case progressed, the ma-
jor airlines raised prices seven times99-albeit with many false starts,
retreats, and delays-as the oligopolistic discipline frayed by Ameri-
can's April price cuts was restored. In December, while announcing
another round of price increases, Continental reported publicly that
its "objective [was] to get back to the fare levels that prevailed in early
92 Cont'l Airlines, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 1993-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,334, at
70,755 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
93 See Cont'l Airlines, 824 F. Supp. at 692.
94 See Lauren R. Rublin, The Trader, BARRON'S, Apr. 27, 1992, at 53.
95 Ron Hutcheson, Airlines Take Dogfight to Congress, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM,
June 11, 1992, at IA; Northwest Sues American, Alleging Unfair Pricing Policy, THE DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, June 13, 1992, at 14F.
96 See Bret Pulley, Northwest Air Plans to Raise U.S. Fares 10%, WALL ST. J., June 17,
1992, at Bl.
97 See Air Fares Set to Increase 4.4 Percent, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 17, 1992.
98 See American Airlines Increases Its Fares, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1992, at D4; Richard
D'Ambrosio, Airfares Climbing 5-10% This Week, Bus. TRAVEL NEWS, Oct. 19, 1992, at 4;
James S. Hirsch, Airlines Taking Yet Another Stab at Boosting Fares, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 1992,
at B2; Bridget O'Brian, Airlines Plan to Raise Fares, Allow Discounts to Expire, WALL ST. J., Sept.
1, 1992, at B1.
99 See Jane Baird, Continental, Other Major Airlines Ready to Increase Fares, HOUSTON
CHRON., Dec. 24, 1992, at lB. The Houston Chronicle quotes an industry source who called
Continental's year-end increase "the seventh major fare increase since July," when, accord-
ing to the Chronicle, "fares hit bottom." Id. The source opined that "the airlines are raising
their fares as fast as then can" in response to the government's price-fixing investigation.
Id. Whether it was the price-fixing investigation, the predatory pricing lawsuits, some com-
bination of the two, or neither that precipitated the higher prices cannot be determined
with certainty. Given the timing of the events, however, it is not unlikely that the predatory
pricing lawsuits played a role.
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April, which [were] fair, market-based competitive fares."'10 0 Such
overt price signaling through media comments frequently accompa-
nied the upward pricing movements following the filing of the preda-
tory pricing suits. A headline about the September fare increases in
Tour and Travel News reported (apparendy without conscious irony):
"Airlines Agree on Fare-Increase Date."''
There is little doubt that the airline fare war that began with
American's price cuts in April ended within weeks after Northwest
and Continental filed their predatory pricing suits. How significant a
role the predatory pricing suit played in deterring aggressive price
competition and restoring lockstep price increases is uncertain. The
predatory pricing lawsuit was not the only strategic tool available or
utilized by competitor airlines. The competitors also took their com-
plaint to the Senate Transportation Committee's aviation subcommit-
tee' 0 2 and engaged in unabashed price signaling through the media.
The predatory pricing lawsuit, however, may have complemented the
competitors' other strategic tools through its unique combination of
coercive opportunities, including raising their rival's costs through liti-
gation expenses, detailed information exchange during discovery, and
the threat of a substantial adverse judgment. And the predatory pric-
ing case may have taught American a lesson. After the jury returned a
verdict for American in the predatory pricing case in the summer of
1993, American CEO Robert Crandall-the same CEO caught on tape
encouraging Braniff to raise its prices-stated publicly that American
"probably won't be attempting that type of leadership again."'10 3
Even in cases where no private predatory pricing lawsuit was filed,
but one airline complained to the Department of Justice or Depart-
ment of Transportation about another's fares, the predatory pricing
complaint may have worked as a price signal. Complaining to the gov-
ernment about a competitor's low prices may be one of the cheapest
and most effective ways of organizing a tacit cartel, even if a govern-
ment suit is relatively unlikely. 10 4 The complaint is privileged from
100 Id. (quoting a Continental Airlines spokesperson).
101 William Terdoslavich, Airlines Agree on Fare-Increase Date, ToUR & TRAVL NEws,
Sept. 14, 1992, at 2.
102 See Hutcheson, supra note 95.
103 Gattuso, supra note 88. Doubtlessly, the Department ofJustice that sued American
for predatory pricing in 1999 would disagree that American learned its lesson from the
Continental and Northwest litigation, although American prevailed in the Justice Depart-
ment lawsuit as well. See United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1111 (10th Cir. 2003).
104 SeeJames C. Miller III, Comments on Baumol and Ordover, 28J.L. & ECON. 267 (1985).
Miller, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, commented in reference to WilliamJ.
Baumol and Janusz A. Ordover's article, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28 J.L. &
ECON. 247 (1985), particularly on their comments about predatory pricing cases. See
Miller, supra. Miller reported that, as Chairman of the FTC, he frequently saw competitor
firms engaging in rent-seeking. Id. at 267.
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antitrust scrutiny unless blatantly fraudulent' 05 and is therefore a
much safer way of sending a message than direct communication, as
American Airlines learned after the Crandall-Putnam debacle.
b. Tobacco
Like the airline industry, the tobacco industry has seen repeated
allegations of both collusion and predatory pricing in the last twenty
years. 10 6 The Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
case, involving the generic cigarette market, turns on allegations of
both predation and collusion, and provides useful factual detail to
consider the relationship between oligopolistic pricing and predation
claims. 10 7 Plaintiff Liggett theorized that Brown & Williamson used
predatory pricing to try to achieve oligopoly pricing.'08 It alleged that
Brown & Williamson sought to punish Liggett's price cutting in the
generic cigarette segment through below-cost volume rebates to Lig-
gett wholesalers. 10 9 Justice Kennedy's Supreme Court majority opin-
ion rejected Liggett's arguments on the grounds that Brown &
Williamson would have been unable to recoup its below-cost pricing
through subsequent supracompetitive pricing, since Brown & William-
son's eleven- to twelve-percent share of the cigarette market would
have required its predation to generate around nine dollars in
supracompetitive profits for every dollar invested in the scheme, just
for Brown & Williamson to break even. 110 The majority dismissed the
arguments that actual recoupment had taken place, finding that the
claims of postpredation price increases were either empirically unsup-
ported or not causally linked to the allegedly predatory scheme."'
The dissent-and the jury-believed that actual recoupment had
taken place in the form of semiannual, lockstep price increases follow-
ing Brown & Williamson's below-cost pricing. 112
A third possibility is that the oligopolistic pricing did emerge
from the events at issue but that it was precipitated more by the preda-
tory pricing lawsuit than by the alleged predatory pricing. Consider
the sequence of events. Brown & Williamson started the price war in
July of 1984 at the time it was introducing its own black and white
105 See Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972); E. R.R.
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight Co., 365 U.S. 127, 136 (1961).
106 See generally Daniel A. Crane, Harmful Output in the Antitrust Domain: Lessons from the
Tobacco Industry, 39 GA. L. REv. 321 (2005) (discussing and analyzing tobacco antitrust
allegations).
107 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
108 See id. at 212.
109 See id. at 217.
110 Id. at 228.
1I Id. at 235-37.
112 See id. at 249-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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cigarettes. 1 3 Liggett immediately sued alleging trademark infringe-
ment and unfair competition. 14 On July 17, 1984, Liggett amended
its complaint to add Robinson-Patman Act claims of predatory pric-
ing." 5 In June of 1985, after it had been litigating its predatory pric-
ing claims for just less than a year, Liggett raised its prices.' 16 Brown
& Williamson followed suit in October of 1985.117 By the end of the
year, the price war was over.1'8 By the middle of 1986, the generic
segment had settled into a comfortable pattern of semiannual, lock-
step price increases in line with patterns in the branded cigarette
market.119
Assuming that the lockstep pricing in the generic market reflects
at least noncompetitive oligopoly pricing, who is to blame-Liggett or
Brown & Williamson? Perhaps the answer is neither, since oligopoly
pricing in the generic segment was inevitable given that the same four
or five firms already marched in lockstep in the branded cigarette seg-
ment.120 But tacit collusion takes some subtle organizing; who was the
organizer? Liggett blamed Brown & Williamson because it started the
price war, but the evidence suggests that Brown & Williamson's price
strategy was profit maximizing without any expectation of recoupment
through oligopoly pricing. The amount of supracompetitive profits
the generic segment would have needed to generate in order to offset
the costs of a predatory scheme were unattainable.' 2 ' Liggett, on the
other hand, could help to organize lockstep pricing by filing a preda-
tory pricing lawsuit-an expensive venture, but far less so than pricing
below cost across the substantial generic cigarette market for eighteen
months.' 22 Having laid out its predation theory, exchanged docu-
ments in discovery, and perhaps signaled a truce, Liggett then took
the lead in raising prices. The industry soon followed. The evidence
in Brooke Group is consistent with the proposition that Liggett used its
113 See id. at 215-16 (majority opinion).
114 See id. at 216.
115 See Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., No. C-84-617-D,
1988 WL 161235, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 1988).
116 See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 217.
117 See Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 964 F.2d 335, 338
(4th Cir. 1992), affd sub noma. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. 209.
118 See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (characterizing price war
as lasting for eighteen months, from July 1984 to the end of 1985).
119 Id. at 218 (majority opinion). The majority believed that these price increases may
have been offset by coupons, stickers, and give-aways, see id. at 236, although at least one
witness testified that the consumer promotions did not nearly offset the price increases, id.
at 250 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing testimony by Liggett's expert economist to the
effect that "[the] promotional activity has been far outstripped by the list price increases").
120 See id. at 213 (majority opinion).
121 See id. at 228.
122 Liggett, of course, hoped to gain from the predatory pricing lawsuit even if it did
not help to facilitate cartel pricing. It won a $148.8 million judgment, although the district
court ultimately vacated it. Id. at 218.
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predatory pricing case to facilitate a pattern of oligopoly pricing. On
balance, this proposition seems far more plausible than the proposi-
tion that Brown & Williamson used a predatory pricing scheme to try
to discipline Liggett into tacit collusion.
The airline and tobacco cases share a common pattern of events:
One firm initiated a price war, its rival(s) sued for predatory pricing,
shortly after the filing of the predatory pricing lawsuit the plaintiff
raised its prices, shortly thereafter the defendant followed suit, oligop-
oly pricing discipline was restored, and the court or jury ultimately
found the predatory pricing lawsuit to be without merit. In both of
these examples, it is quite possible that predatory pricing law facili-
tated the high prices that it is meant to deter.
B. Do Firms Actually Engage in Strategic Predatory Pricing
Litigation?
It is not hard to see how a firm could use predatory pricing law-
suits strategically to chill price competition, but is there evidence that
firms actually engage in strategic predatory pricing litigation? The
question does not admit of a ready answer. Firms' true motivations
for filing suit are not easily discoverable and even if good information
were available, firms' motivations are rarely reducible to a simple di-
chotomy like strategic benefits in the marketplace versus money judg-
ment or settlement. The truth is likely to' be more complex.
One approach to appraising the intentions of predatory pricing
plaintiffs is to examine market-structural prerequisites for successful
predation and determine whether those structures are in place in
cases of alleged predation. If the structural prerequisites are absent,
this may suggest frivolous litigation animated by ulterior motives. Ed-
ward Snyder and Thomas Kauper took this approach in their 1991
study, which concluded that competitor plaintiffs systematically mis-
use the antitrust laws. 123 Synder and Kauper evaluated antitrust litiga-
tion files collected in the Georgetown Study of Private Antitrust
Litigation 124 and determined whether the market conditions neces-
sary for anticompetitive exclusion were present in the cases in which
such exclusion was asserted. 125 In particular, they contended that a
market must exhibit a high degree of concentration and substantial
barriers to entry in order for exclusionary conduct to be successful in
achieving monopoly profits. 126 Snyder and Kauper studied ten preda-
123 See Snyder & Kauper, supra note 20, at 598.
124 The Georgetown Study of Private Antitrust Litigation was a 1983 study sponsored
by the Georgetown University Law Center. See PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION (LawrenceJ.
White ed., 1988); Symposium, Private Antitrust Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J. 999 (1986); Lawrence
J. White, The Georgetown Study of Private Antitrust Litigation, 54 ANTITRUST LJ. 59 (1985).
125 See Snyder & Kauper, supra note 20, at 563-67.
126 See id. at 564.
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tion cases and concluded that only two out of the ten exhibited the
necessary high degree of defendant market share and barriers to entry
necessary to make the predation claim plausible. 12 7 Although Snyder
and Kauper did not articulate any separate conclusion on the preda-
tory pricing cases, their overall conclusion that few of the competitor
cases exhibited much merit and that many of the plaintiffs were "ob-
ject[ing] to actions that represent[ed] increases in competition"'128
would appear to apply to the predation cases also.
A similar analysis suggests that many of the post-Brooke Group
predatory pricing cases are also misuses of the antitrust laws. A large
number of them that were decided on the merits were thrown out
based on the market screens identified by Snyder and Kauper-insuf-
ficient market concentration or low barriers to entry. 129 This suggests
127 See id. at 572-73.
128 Id. at 576.
129 See Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284 F.3d 1237, 1250 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding that defen-
dant's market share of 35-40% was insufficient evidence of market power in a predatory
pricing case); W. Parcel Express v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 190 F.3d 974, 975 (9th
Cir. 1999) (rejecting plaintiff's predatory pricing claim on grounds that barriers to entry
were not proven); Steams Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 530 (5th Cir.
1999) (same); Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ltd., 133 F.3d 103, 107-08
(1st Cir. 1997) (rejecting predatory pricing claim where defendant's market share was
about 10%); Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 442 (3d Cir.
1997) (rejecting predatory pricing claim on grounds that plaintiff failed to show defendant
had market power); El Aguila Food Prods., Inc. v. Gruma Corp., 301 F. Supp. 2d 612, 629
(S.D. Tex. 2003) (rejecting predatory pricing claim where defendant lacked market
power); Masco Contractor Servs. E., Inc. v. Beals, 279 F. Supp. 2d 699, 707 (E.D. Va. 2003)
(dismissing predatory pricing claim based on absence of barriers to entry); Berlyn, Inc. v.
Gazette Newspapers, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 2d 718, 736-37 (D. Md. 2002) (rejecting predatory
pricing claim where plaintiff failed to show any proof that defendant had monopoly or
market power in any market); Coventry Health Care of Kan., Inc. v. Via Christi Health Sys.,
Inc., 176 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1233 (D. Kan. 2001) (denying motion for preliminary injunc-
tion against defendant's pricing partly on grounds that defendant lacked market power
and barriers to entry were low, and therefore plaintiff did not demonstrate a reasonable
likelihood of winning on the merits); Yellow Page Solutions, Inc. v. Bell At]. Yellow Pages
Co., 2002-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 73,556, at 92,567-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing preda-
tory pricing claims because plaintiff failed to plead market power or specific entry barri-
ers); United Magazine Co. v. Murdoch Magazines Distribution, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 2d 385,
402-03 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing predatory pricing claim where plaintiff failed to show
that defendant had market power); Peerless Heater Co. v. Mestek, Inc., 2000-1 Trade Cases
(CCH) 72,917, at 87,813-14 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (granting summaryjudgment against plain-
tiff on predatory pricing claim where plaintiffs growing market share precluded any infer-
ence that plaintiff was in danger of being driven from the market);J & S Oil, Inc. v. Irving
Oil Corp., 63 F. Supp. 2d 62, 68 (D. Me. 1999) (granting defendant's motion for summary
judgment where defendant had low market share and barriers to entry were low); Malek
Wholesaler, Inc. v. First Film Extruding, Ltd., No. 97-CV-07087, 1998 WL 142385, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 1998) (dismissing predatory pricing claim where plaintiff failed to allege
that defendant had market power); Bushnell Corp. v. ITT Corp., 175 F.R.D. 584, 587 (D.
Kan. 1997) (dismissing predatory pricing case where defendant's market share was 30%);
Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 895, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (granting sum-
maryjudgment for defendant where plaintiff failed to show high barriers to entry); Clark v.
Flow Measurement, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 519, 527-28 (D.S.C. 1996) (granting summaryjudg-
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that Matsushita and Brooke Group have not deterred continuation of
some of the misuses of predatory pricing theory that occurred during
the 1973-83 period of the Georgetown Study.'30
But this does not necessarily demonstrate that predatory pricing
plaintiffs are using antitrust law strategically. Snyder and Kauper's
market screen analysis is useful in discovering whether the predation
lawsuits had merit, but it is only tangentially relevant in determining
whether predatory pricing plaintiffs are seeking to use antitrust law to
chill price competition or invite a program of tacit collusion.' 3' Frivo-
lous lawsuits could be filed to extort a favorable settlement, out of a
misunderstanding of the governing legal rules, or even out of a less
efficient firm's misguided sense of injustice at being excluded from
the market. 13 2 All of these motivations may induce socially costly liti-
gation and provide a sufficient basis for curtailing the predatory pric-
ing cause of action, but they do not demonstrate that firms use
predatory pricing law strategically to increase prices.
One way to study the possibility that many predatory pricing
plaintiffs have strategic motivations independent of the ultimate suc-
cess of the lawsuit is to examine the compensation structure of the
plaintiffs' attorneys. The compensation structure of plaintiffs' attor-
neys in predatory pricing cases also provides a relevant check on Bol-
ton, Brodley, and Riordan's assertion that Brooke Group and Matsushita
have created very high barriers for predatory pricing plaintiffs.13 3
Plaintiffs lawyers should only agree to a contingency-fee arrangement
if they believe that there is a reasonable likelihood that the predatory
pricing lawsuit will result in a financial payment from defendant to
plaintiff, through either a money judgment or a settlement. If a pred-
atory pricing case were very unlikely to result in a money judgment or
settlement but might still bring financial benefits to the plaintiff by
chilling price competition, one would expect to see an hourly-fee
structure. Further, the predatory pricing theory assumes that the
plaintiff is financially constrained, indeed that its ability to survive in
the market is jeopardized by a lack of funds necessary to weather the
ment for defendant where defendant's market share was small); AD/SAT v. Associated
Press, 920 F. Supp. 1287, 1299-1300 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (granting summary judgment for de-
fendant where barriers to entry were low).
130 See White, supra note 124, at 60 (describing the time period during which cases
were examined).
131 See Snyder & Kauper, supra note 20, at 563-67.
132 See Peter H. Huang, Emotional Responses in Litigation, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 31
(1992); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics and Settlement: A New Look at
the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REv. 77, 79-81 (1997); JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses,
and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 113, 122 (1996).
133 Bolton et al., supra note 8, at 2267.
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defendant's below-cost pricing.1 34 Such firms are unlikely to be able
to pay for expensive predatory pricing litigation on an out-of-pocket
basis. One plaintiffs attorney involved in at least three recent preda-
tory pricing cases reported that "antitrust litigation on an hourly basis
is something that 99% of the injured businesses in the U.S. cannot
afford."' 3 5
Consistent with these observations, the following hypotheses can
be drawn. If firms are using predatory pricing theories for strategic
purposes even in the absence of a significant possibility of obtaining a
favorable judgment or settlement, there should be a low incidence of
contingency-fee arrangements in purely strategic predatory pricing
cases. Conversely, if a firm's capital is truly constrained by predation,
it would be likely to prefer a contingency-fee structure as opposed to
an hourly rate. Firms driven by predatory pricing to the verge of fi-
nancial extinction should not be able to afford financing lengthy and
expensive predatory pricing litigation on an hourly, out-of-pocket ba-
sis. Finally, economically rational lawyers should only agree to take
predatory pricing cases on contingency if there is some reasonable
prospect-Brooke Group and Matsushita notwithstanding-of a
favorable plaintiff's judgment or settlement.
In order to evaluate these hypotheses, I attempted to contact the
plaintiffs' attorneys involved in the predatory pricing cases filed after
1993, as identified earlier, 136 and inquire whether their fee structure
was based on an hourly rate, contingency, or some combination of the
two.
1 3 7 Out of the fifty-seven cases, some of the attorneys could not be
located and some declined to respond, often on grounds of confiden-
tiality.'38 The responding attorneys provided fee information for
twenty-four of the predatory pricing cases filed since Brooke Group.13 9
In ten of the cases, the plaintiff's attorney was compensated purely on
an hourly-fee basis.' 40 In eight of the cases, the plaintiff's attorney was
compensated on a pure contingency basis.' 4 1 In four of the cases, the
plaintiffs attorney billed at an hourly rate (on two occasions at a re-
duced rate) with a contingency-fee "kicker" in the event of a successful
134 Paul Milgrom &John Roberts, New Theories of Predatory Pricing, in INDUSTRIAL STRUC-
TURE IN THE NEW INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 112, 118-23 (Giacomo Bonanno & Dario
Brandolini eds., 1990); Bolton et al., supra note 8, at 2286-87.
135 E-mail from Carl E. Person to Daniel Crane, Assistant Professor of Law, Cardozo
Law School (Jan. 5, 2005) (on file with author, used with permission of Mr. Person).
136 See cases cited supra note 129.
'37 Interviews with Plaintiffs Attorneys (Dec. 2004) (on file with author).
138 Id.
139 Id. Several of the responding attorneys were or had been involved in more than
one of the predatory pricing cases listed in note 129.
140 Id.
141 Id.
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outcome. 142 In two other cases, the plaintiff paid a small, up-front fee
and the remainder of the compensation was on contingency. 14 3 As-
suming that the kicker cases are largely hourly-fee cases and the up-
front-fee cases are largely contingency cases, this yields a 14 to 10 split
in favor of hourly fees.
This is a small sample from which to draw conclusions, and a
wider sample is unlikely to be attainable given the relatively small
number of candidate cases and the reluctance of many attorneys to
disclose fee structure information. Further, some of the cases in-
volved claims other than predatory pricing, which could have influ-
enced the fee structure in either direction.144 Nonetheless, this
modest sample-with its limitations-permits a few conclusions.
First, despite Brooke Group and Matsushita, some predatory pricing
cases continue to attract contingency-fee lawyers. 14 5 At least some pre-
dation claims have a sufficient likelihood of succeeding on the merits
such that plaintiffs' attorneys are willing to invest in them.1 4 6 This
implicit evaluation of the viability of predation cases provides some
indication that predation theories are not moribund in practice.
Some predation suits have a significant positive expected value. If de-
fendants' lawyers reach the same conclusion as plaintiffs' lawyers, then
threats of predation claims may still affect the market behavior of po-
tential defendants. The risk that the predatory pricing offense may
chill vigorous price competition may persist despite two decades of
defendant-friendly precedents.
Second, plaintiffs pay for a significant number of predatory pric-
ing cases-perhaps a majority147-on an hourly-fee basis. The hourly-
fee method of lawsuit financing is somewhat inconsistent with the gen-
eral theory of predation-that a poorly financed firm is forced out of
a market because it cannot afford to compete with a better-financed
rival. 148 Predatory pricing litigation is an expensive and speculative
investment, much like engaging in a price war to survive in a mar-
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Very few cases solely involve a predatory pricing claim. Often, while the predatory
pricing claims appear to be the principal complaint, the plaintiff also pleads other antitrust
wrongs as well. These may be efforts to avoid the strictures on predatory pricing theories
imposed by Chicago School-era case law.
145 See text accompanying note 130.
146 See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
147 There is reason to believe that a full census of predatory pricing cases would show
that a higher percentage of cases are brought on an hourly-rate basis than the twenty-four
cases on which data were collected would suggest. Many of the attorneys who declined to
respond work for large corporate law firms that are relatively unlikely to take matters on
contingency. See Interviews with Plaintiffs Attorneys, supra note 137.
148 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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ket. 1 49 If a firm lacks the funds necessary to compete in a price war, it
is unclear where the firm would find the funds to finance predatory
pricing litigation on an out-of-pocket basis. Conversely, the fact that
many firms engage in predatory pricing litigation on an hourly-fee
basis is consistent with the theory that some firms use predatory pric-
ing cases strategically to chill price competition even in cases that have
relatively little chance of resulting in a plaintiff's verdict or monetary
settlement.
In sum, the available information on lawyer fee structures in
post-Brooke Group predatory pricing cases supports two hypotheses re-
garding the Chicago School predatory pricing precedents: First, that
the potential for substantial plaintiffs verdicts in predatory pricing
cases remains, and second, that some firms use predatory pricing com-
plaints strategically to diminish price competition by competitors.
II
THE SOCIAL COSTS OF CHILLING PRICE COMPETITION
The courts have accepted as a given that predatory pricing law
would be socially costly if it elevated prices above competitive levels.1 50
Conversely, if it were possible to detect with precision those instances
in which a dominant firm sought to cut prices to levels that could
exclude or discipline equally efficient competitors and facilitate
supracompetitive pricing, social welfare would be best served by deter-
ring such behavior. 151 Both of these propositions share the common
assumption that social welfare is optimized if prices are established by
competitive market forces and not by monopolistic coercion by domi-
nant firms or misguided invocation of governmental coercion in pred-
atory pricing litigation. Structuring predatory pricing law thus
149 Estimates of the costs of predatory pricing lawsuits vary considerably. In 1981,
Joshua Greenberg estimated the mean litigation cost of a predation case to be $30 million
and, at the same conference, Frank Easterbrook estimated it to be $3 million. Frank H.
Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 335 & n.157
(1981). Easterbrook reported that AT&T spent $100 million to defend itself against
charges of predation every year-a large aggregate amount, but one that is distributed over
multiple lawsuits. See id. at 334. Based on the Georgetown Study, Salop and White con-
cluded that private antitrust lawsuits cost, on average, $75,000 per party in 1984 dollars, or
the equivalent of about $135,000 in 2005 dollars. See Steven C. Salop & LawrenceJ. White,
Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1015 (1986). For more
complex cases, the average legal cost per party was $194,000, again in 1984 dollars, or over
$350,000 in 2005 dollars. Id. at 1014. These numbers seem relatively low for predatory
pricing litigation, which may be more resource intensive than average antitrust litigation.
Other estimates of the costs of antitrust legal fees-which may be more in line with average
costs in predatory pricing cases-include Fisher and Lande's estimate of a total cost of
$700,000 to $1.4 million for merger cases in 1983 dollars. Alan A. Fisher & Robert H.
Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1580, 1673 n.308
(1983).
150 See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
151 See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
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requires a comparison of the likely costs of deviating from a competi-
tive market model through monopolistic behavior or through mis-
guided state coercion.
To perform such a comparison, this Article starts with an ideal
pricing model in a competitive market. Part II.A establishes the so-
cially optimal pricing point against which deviations should be mea-
sured. Part II.B presents the theoretical model of deviation from the
norm caused by the existence of predatory pricing law and compares
the likely costs of monopolistic predation to the likely costs of dimin-
ished price competition resulting from the threat of liability for preda-
tory pricing. Part II.C reports the results of a survey of in-house
counsel that I conducted to explore the degree to which predatory
pricing law influences pricing behavior by business executives.
A. The Socially Optimal Pricing Point
Neoclassical price theory holds that in perfect competition, firms
price at marginal cost, which leads to optimal deployment of social
resources.1 52 This assumption underlies the influential Areeda-Tur-
ner "average variable cost" formulation for predatory pricing.153 Phil-
lip Areeda and Donald Turner assume that "pricing at marginal cost is
the competitive and socially optimal result"'154 and therefore organize
their proposed predatory pricing rules around marginal cost norma-
tivity.' 55 They choose average variable cost as the measuring legal cri-
terion, which is used as a proxy for marginal cost-an economic
construct that is difficult to determine from business records.1 56
There is substantial literature rejecting or attempting to refine
Areeda and Turner's proposed marginal cost rule, but it largely agrees
with Areeda and Turner's normative assumption that marginal cost
pricing is socially optimal under static circumstances. This competing
body of scholarship tends to stress the dynamic effects of strategic
pricing and the potential that a marginal cost legal rule would be both
underinclusive and overinclusive with respect to predatory pricing.
F.M. Scherer, Areeda and Turner's most immediate critic, concurs
that marginal cost pricing is socially optimal, but asserts that their pro-
posed legal rule ignores the long-run welfare effects of strategic short-
run pricing above marginal cost but below total cost. 157 Oliver Wil-
152 F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE 19-20 (3d ed. 1990); Areeda & Turner, supra note 25, at 711; Williamson, supra
note 28, at 289.
153 See Areeda & Turner, supra note 25, at 709-12.
154 Id. at 711.
155 See id. at 709-12.
156 See id. at 716.
157 See F.M. Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARv. L. REV.
869, 883-85 (1976); see also Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pricing:
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liamson agrees that "[m] arginal cost pricing on a continuing basis has
the optimality properties to which Areeda and Turner refer,"1 58 but is
concerned that their proposed legal rule would immunize short-term
predatory price cuts that would lead to later supracompetitive pric-
ing. 159 Similarly, William Baumol agrees with the underlying premise
that marginal cost pricing optimizes social welfare, but adds the addi-
tional caveat that marginal cost pricing is "chimerical" in most real
markets since "pricing at marginal cost will not produce revenues
equal to total production costs. '1 60 Where marginal cost pricing is
unsustainable in the long run, Baumol would institute Ramsey pricing
as the optimal deviation from marginal cost that predatory pricing law
should seek to attain. 161 Under Ramsey pricing, prices deviate from
marginal cost only as much as to make continued production remu-
nerative, and deviations from marginal cost are distributed to prod-
ucts with the least elastic demand in order to minimize deadweight
losses. 162 Thus, despite differences over the legal standards that
should govern predatory pricing claims, there is substantial agree-
ment that the more closely pricing approximates marginal cost in a
sustainable manner, the more that efficiency is optimized. 163
A related question is whether a nonpredatory price can ever be
suboptimally low because it induces overconsumption. This could oc-
cur if a firm erroneously priced below marginal cost. Although the
firm may lose money on its sales, it might not threaten competition if
the firm lacked a sufficiently large share of the market, assuming bar-
riers to entry were very low, or if other structural prerequisites exclud-
ing competition were absent. Or a potential predator might launch
an unsuccessful scheme to exclude a rival, which results only in lower
prices without the probability of higher prices in the future.16 4 Such
A Reply, 89 HARv. L. REv. 891 (1976); F.M. Scherer, Some Last Words on Predatory Pricing, 89
HARV. L. REv. 901 (1976).
158 Williamson, supra note 28, at 290.
159 See id.
160 William J. Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of Pred-
atory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 1, 21 (1979).
161 See id. at 20-22.
162 See F.P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47 (1927); see also
WilliamJ. Baumol, Ramsey Pricing, in 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DIcTIoNARY OF ECONOMICS 49,
49-51 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987) (defining Ramsey pricing); W. Kip Viscusi ET AL.,
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 350-53 (3d ed. 2000) (same); Baumol, supra
note 160, at 22 (same).
163 See Edlin, supra note 8, at 951 ("If the monopoly charges a price in excess of its
marginal cost, the monopoly creates an inefficiency compared to an ideal world because
output is restricted."); Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Preda-
tory PricingPolicy, 89 YALE L.J. 213, 223 ( "[A]ny [predatory pricing] standard that encour-
ages entry by forcing price to be kept above long-run marginal cost for a period of time
necessarily runs the risk of preserving inefficient firms .... ).
164 Attempted monopolization through unsuccessful predatory pricing is punished in
order to deter such conduct. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. The probabilistic
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nonpredatory below-cost pricing is allocatively inefficient, even if it
does not lead to, or threaten, later supracompetitive pricing, because
it induces the consumption of goods by some consumers who value
them at less than the cost of production, creating a deadweight loss.1 65
It is not clear whether the subsidization of consumers by inept or
misguided producers should be of significant concern under the anti-
trust laws. The answer depends in part on whether allocative effi-
ciency or consumer welfare is the primary goal of antitrust
enforcement. 166 Below-cost, nonexclusionary prices may benefit con-
sumers even if they are costly to producers. If consumer welfare is the
primary goal, then such mistaken below-cost pricing may be a harm-
less fortuity. However, even if consumer welfare is the primary focus,
below-cost, nonexclusionary prices may harm consumers by sending
false price signals that result in poor consumption planning by con-
sumers. 167 Moreover, spillover effects in other markets cannot be ig-
nored.1 68 If a firm begins selling at below-cost prices it may increase its
demand for raw inputs used for the production of other goods and
thereby increase the price of those other goods.
From these considerations two assumptions, one strong and one
weak, can be drawn. The strong assumption concerns prices above
marginal cost: Social welfare is optimized by competitive behavior that
drives prices down toward a long-run marginal cost equilibrium, given
the constraint that where long-run marginal cost pricing would be un-
remunerative, Ramsey pricing is the next best substitute. The weak
assumption concerns prices below marginal cost: Even in the absence
of a likelihood that sub-marginal cost pricing will exclude competi-
tors and lead to supracompetitive pricing, sub-marginal cost pricing is
allocatively inefficient and from an economic standpoint should be
harm in such cases justifies the invocation of legal sanctions to deter it. A separate issue
arises when an attempt to monopolize through predatory pricing has no significant likeli-
hood of succeeding and leads to lower prices. Such instances of "stupid predation" might
still be thought to cause resource misallocation because they would lead to the consump-
tion of the goods by some consumers who valued the goods at less than their cost of
production.
165 See, e.g.,Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 163, at 224 n.31 ("If price is less than short-
run marginal cost, and if demand is at all elastic, the price will not give consumers the
proper signal about the scarcity value of the good. Thus, consumers will purchase too
much of the good and as a result, too many resources will be devoted to producing the
particular good in the short run."); Scherer, supra note 157, at 883 ("Resource misalloca-
tion occurs when there is a divergence between the cost of additional output and the value
of that output to consumers. Output is too low when production stops short of the level at
which price equals marginal cost; it is too high when marginal cost exceeds the price.").
166 SeeJoseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and
Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1020, 1032-33 (1987) (differentiating between allo-
cative efficiency and consumer welfare).
167 See Williamson, supra note 28, at 291.
168 See R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REv. ECON.
STur). 11 (1956).
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discouraged. It is thus against marginal cost pricing as a presumptive
baseline that the effects of both predatory pricing and the availability
of a predatory pricing theory must be assessed.
B. The Tendency of Predatory Pricing Law to Induce Deviations
from Marginal Cost Pricing
Part I described the possibility that firms would deliberately use
predatory pricing law to induce their rivals to deviate from competi-
tive pricing. Such strategic use of predatory pricing law has obvious
adverse social welfare effects since it induces upward deviation from
marginal cost pricing. The only remaining question is an empirical
one-whether such strategic gamesmanship is common and effective.
If it is, then predatory pricing law has a significant strike against it.
Unfortunately, determining whether firms engage in strategic preda-
tory pricing litigation or threats-litigation or threats in which the
likelihood of a successful judicial outcome is very small, but where
price competition can be chilled regardless of the judicial outcome-
is difficult. As discussed in the preceding Part, some available data are
consistent with the hypothesis that some firms use predatory pricing
litigation strategically, but direct proof is limited.
Predatory pricing law may induce socially costly deviations from
marginal cost pricing even when predation theories are not strategi-
cally misused. In order for predatory pricing law to induce a firm to
deviate from optimal competitive pricing, it is sufficient that the firm
expect that the costs of any further price reduction due to predatory
pricing law will exceed the gains from lowering its price and increas-
ing its market share. Consider the profit-maximizing firm faced with a
choice between reducing its price to expand market share and achieve
economies of scale or maintaining its current price. The firm will
only reduce its price so long as its market share and efficiency gains
exceed its expected costs due to predatory pricing litigation expenses
and a potential adverse judgment. At the point where any further
price reduction would create greater expected losses than gains, pred-
atory pricing law places a floor on the firm's movement toward margi-
nal cost pricing. Thus, predatory pricing law may keep prices above
competitive levels even if it is not intentionally misused.
Although predatory pricing law's creation of such a pricing floor
appears to impose social costs, it is necessary to take into account the
possibility that the pricing floor is optimal because any further price
cuts would be unsustainable and therefore would result, in the long
run, in monopoly pricing even further distanced from the marginal
cost optimum. Thus, if predatory pricing law placed a pricing floor at
the Ramsey pricing level, social welfare might still be optimized, given
the constraint that firms need to cover total costs. Typically, however,
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it will be difficult to determine whether a particular firm accused of
predation has engaged in Ramsey pricing since predatory pricing liti-
gation focuses on whether the defendant's product is competitive with
the plaintiffs product, and not on the demand elasticities for all prod-
ucts in the defendant's product portfolio. 169 Any claim that predatory
pricing law achieves the social optimum by forcing a firm to price
above marginal cost and therefore ensures that equally efficient com-
petitor firms, pricing at the same level, could cover a pro rata share of
joint and common costs is generally unverifiable in the context of
predatory pricing litigation. 1 70
Even conceding that some pricing floor above marginal cost
would be optimal in some cases, there remains the possibility that
predatory pricing law may set the floor above the optimal level. Con-
versely, the absence of predatory pricing law could result in prices fall-
ing temporarily below the Ramsey price, and even below marginal
cost, creating an initial allocative inefficiency due to overconsump-
tion, and ultimately resulting in monopoly pricing after weaker firms
are excluded from the market and then an even greater long-run allo-
cative inefficiency due to deadweight losses. The optimal pricing
point is a generally unknowable abstraction that can rarely be pin-
pointed in actual cases. Wherever the optimal point resides, though, it
is clear that the presence or absence of predatory pricing law could
exert an upward pull away from the optimal pricing point.
The potential of predatory pricing law to induce deviations from
optimal pricing has been previously considered, but with more limited
assumptions than those postulated here. Paul Joskow and Alvin
Klevorick consider the social costs of predatory pricing law as a ques-
tion of false positives and false negatives. 171 Their discussion largely
assumes that the social costs of predatory pricing rules arise from er-
169 The process of adjudicating predatory pricing cases differs considerably from estab-
lishing optimal prices for regulated industries. See KENNETH E. TRAIN, OPrIMAL REGULA-
TION: THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 115-40 (1991) (discussing Ramsey
pricing solutions for regulated industries); see also Jerry Hausman & Howard Shelanski,
Economic Welfare and Telecommunications Regulation: The E-Rate Policy for Universal-Service Subsi-
dies, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 19, 34-36 (1999) (discussing the distributional costs and welfare-
maximizing benefits of Ramsey pricing solutions in telecommunications regulation). In a
predatory pricing case, the court is not called upon to determine the optimal pricing in
the relevant market given elasticities of demand in all other affected markets, but only
focuses on the single market under consideration.
170 See Bolton et al., supra note 8, at 2272 (noting that allocating joint and common
costs is an "undertaking that lacks a precise methodology and is particularly unsuited to
jury resolution"). Ramsey pricing requires allocation of the joint and common costs by
reference to the demand elasticities of the various products in the firm's portfolio. See
supra note 162 and accompanying text. But the difficulty of discovering the socially opti-
mal pricing point goes beyond merely finding a rational way to allocate joint and common
costs.
171 SeeJoskow & Klevorick, supra note 163, at 223.
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ror in the ultimate disposition of predation cases)172 Similarly, Easter-
brook considers the costs of legal action for predation to arise from
false positives that "choke off desirable price reductions."'173 While
these observations are correct, they do not describe all of predation
law's effects on pricing behavior. The mere availability of a predatory
pricing cause of action for ostensibly injured competitors would cre-
ate social costs even if the predation offense were perfectly defined
and adjudication always accurate. As discussed in the previous sec-
tion, a firm could make its rival reluctant to engage in nonpredatory
price cutting by threatening to raise the rival's costs through litigation
or engage in strategic predatory pricing litigation to organize a cartel.
Further, whether or not a competitor strategically misused predatory
pricing law, the costs of -predatory pricing litigation could induce a
firm to refrain from price cutting because the litigation costs would
exceed any profitability gains from the price cutting. Thus, even spec-
ification of the correct substantive rule of predatory pricing and
perfection in adjudicatory results would entail social costs because the
mere fact that courts will hear predation suits will induce some firms
to forgo procompetitive price cuts.
If predatory pricing law exists at all, it will inevitably exert a pull
away from optimal pricing. If the predation cause of action were abol-
ished, the absence of predatory pricing law would also induce a devia-
tion from optimal pricing. Ideally, one would like to know whether
the existence or absence of predatory pricing law would exert a
greater deviation. To study that empirically, however, one would need
to compare an economy in which predation was perfectly legal with
one in which it was illegal. The incidence and costs of predatory pric-
ing in a regime without any predatory pricing prohibition has been
the matter of considerable academic controversy, but remains highly
speculative. 174 It is unlikely to be ascertained empirically except by
reference to historical case studies of particular firms from the time
period before the adoption of the Sherman Act,175 since predatory
172 Joskow and Klevorick acknowledge the possibility of "harassing litigation . . .
brought by competitors seeking to protect themselves," but believe that these costs would
be minimized by the types of per se rules they reject. Id. at 242.
173 Easterbrook, supra note 149, at 322.
174 Compare BORK, supra note 1, at 144 (arguing that "[u]nsophisticated theories of
predation . . . [have led] to drastic overestimations of its likelihood"), and Easterbrook,
supra note 149, at 264 (opining that "there is no sufficient reason for antitrust law or the
courts to take predation seriously" and that predatory pricing strategies may be so common
"for the same reason that 600 years ago there were a thousand positions on what dragons
looked like"), with Bolton et al., supra note 8, at 2241 (arguing that predatory pricing is
significantly more common than Chicago School proponents have argued).
175 In particular, there has been a well-known debate over whether Standard Oil en-
gaged in predatory pricing in the pre-Sherman Act period. Compare John S. McGee, Preda-
tory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137 (1958) (arguing that
Standard Oil did not engage in predatory pricing), with Elizabeth Granitz & Benjamin
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pricing has long been illegal in the United States and in most other
countries with similar economic cultures.1 76 Any studies of business
behavior today are affected by the fact that predatory pricing is
illegal.' 77
Short of eliminating the predation theory to test Bork and Easter-
brook's view that predation would rarely occur in an unregulated
state, it is impossible to be certain how pervasive predation would be
or how long its effects would endure. Given that predation remains
unlawful and the experiment suggested is unlikely to be carried out,
the most salient question is how predatory pricing law's pull away
from marginal cost pricing can be minimized. Consideration of vari-
ous factors affecting the administration of the predatory pricing rem-
edy and the incentives they create with respect to pricing provides a
framework for assessing the optimality of predatory pricing law, given
its effects on firms' incentives to engage in vigorous price competition
and disincentives to engage in predation. For convenience, these fac-
tors are addressed in two parts. The first concerns the incentives cre-
ated by the likelihood of detection, the amount of gain or loss
resulting from both predatory and nonpredatory price cuts, and the
effects of the treble damages remedy. The second part concerns the
effects on pricing behavior of unpredictability in legal outcomes, risk
aversion, and systematic biases toward false positives or negatives.
1. Likelihood of Detection, Gain/Loss Asymmetries, and the Treble
Damages Remedy
Consider the perspective of a firm with a large market share that
is considering cutting its prices to meet competition from a new en-
trant. In Scenario A, the firm's intentions are predatory and the price
cut will only be profitable if it succeeds in excluding the new entrant
and permitting the firm to price above competitive levels. In Scenario
B, the price cut is not predatory and is profit-maximizing simply as a
response to new competition.
Klein, Monopolization &y "Raising Rivals' Costs": The Standard Oil Case, 39 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1996) (arguing that Standard Oil's conduct was predatory).
176 See Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REv. 253, 264
(2003) (discussing the European Commission approach to predatory pricing); Norman W.
Hawker, Predatory Pricing Law in the United States and Canada, 7 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REv. 201
(1999) (discussing the Canadian approach to predatory pricing law); Ross Jones, An Inter-
national Perspective on Anti-Competitive Pricing Practices by Dominant Carriers & Regulatory Rules
to Facilitate Competitive Entry-Australia, 14 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 243, 249-50 (2002) (discussing
the Australian approach to predatory pricing law).
177 See, e.g., Roland H. Koller, The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study, AuNw-
TRUST L. & ECON. REV., Summer 1971, at 105 (examining litigated cases of alleged preda-
tory pricing and determining that they did not in fact involve predation); Snyder &
Kauper, supra note 20, at 572-73 (same).
2005]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
In Scenario A, whether the firm decides to cut its price is a func-
tion of (i) the likelihood that its predation will be detected, (ii) the
expected cost if it is detected, and (iii) the profitability if it is not
detected. As to (i), predatory pricing is relatively likely to be detected
if it occurs.1 78 Most of the behavioral and game theory literature that
has sought to rehabilitate predatory pricing's status has relied on rep-
utation effects to bolster the plausibility of the offense. 1 79 For exam-
ple, Bolton, Brodley, and Riordan's argument that predation is more
likely to occur than the Supreme Court and Chicago School theorists
have asserted is largely based on signaling strategies, reputation ef-
fects, and the communication of information to financial markets. 8 0
Thus, the silent, unobserved predator is inconsistent with today's most
popular theories of predation.
There is one possible exception. Under the cost signaling theory,
"a predator drastically reduces price to mislead the prey into believing
that the predator has lower costs, inducing the prey to exit the mar-
ket."18 1 Since this theory of predation assumes deception by the
predator, it is possible that the prey will wrongly assume that its exclu-
sion from the market was due to its own inefficiency. The deceived
prey never becomes aware of the predation and consequently never
brings suit, thus allowing the predatory pricing to go undetected.
However, even under the cost signaling theory, the deception is short-
lived because of the predator's need to recoup the costs of the con-
cealed predation scheme. Once the predator begins to recoup, it
runs the risk of revealing the deception to the prey, as well as other
firns. 1 82 However, by this time reentry barriers might become high
enough to successfully prevent the deceived prey from challenging
the predator's hegemony.1 8 3 This "deceit, followed by realization too
178 See Easterbrook, supra note 149, at 330.
179 See Bolton et al., supra note 8, at 2299-310 (devoting an entire section to discussing
a reputation-effect predatory pricing strategy); Yun Joo Jung et al., On the Existence of Preda-
tory Pricing: An Experimental Study of Reputation and Entry Deterrence in the Chain-Store Game, 25
RAND J. ECON. 72, 73 (1994) (stating that the chain-store game experiment it conducted
supports the reputation-based argument); Alvin K Klevorick, The Current State of the Law
and Economics of Predatory Pricing, 83 Am. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 162, 163 (1993)
(observing recent scholarship that analyzed how an incumbent could use predation to
build a reputation for toughness and thus discourage potential new market entrants);
David M. Kreps & Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 J. ECON. THEORY
253 (1982) (analyzing the reputation effect in the predatory pricing situation); Paul Mil-
groin & John Roberts, Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence, 27 J. EcoN. THEORY 280
(1982) (using game theory analysis to show that predation may be rational against new
entrants because it yields a reputation that deters entrants); John Roberts, A Signaling
Model of Predatory Pricing, 38 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS (SUPPLEMENT) 75 (1986).
180 See Bolton et al., supra note 8, at 2299-320.
181 Id. at 2318.
182 Id. at 2320.
183 Id. (discussing possible scenarios where the reentry barriers are high enough to
prevent the deceived prey's reentry).
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late" story may account for the success of predation schemes in some
cases, but it does not provide a basis to believe that many predation
schemes ultimately go undetected. Once the prey learns of the con-
cealed predation scheme during the recoupment era, nothing pre-
vents it from acting on that knowledge and bringing a predatory
pricing suit.
Unlike a backroom cartel agreement that will often escape no-
tice, and therefore requires a heightened sanction to deter its com-
mission, predatory pricing, in most cases, will work only if rivals
observe and understand it as a predatory commitment that the
predator is willing to replicate in the future. 184 Predator firms should
expect that their conduct will not go unnoticed. And, if a competitor
observes the conduct and realizes that it is predatory pricing, it is
likely that the competitor will sue, which will subject the predator to
expensive predatory pricing litigation regardless of the outcome. As
to factor (i) in the predator's calculus, then, the likelihood of detec-
tion must be considered to be high.
Factors (ii) and (iii) depend on the probability of an adverse
judgment. The probability of an adverse judgment, in turn, depends
both on whether the Supreme Court and appellate courts have prop-
erly calibrated the governing legal standards and whether the courts
and jury applying the law to the particular case make any mistakes. In
the event of an adverse judgment, the predator will have to pay treble
damages and attorney's fees. This amount is likely to be substantially
larger than any gain that the firm might make through monopoly
pricing after successfully excluding its competitor.18 5 The monopoly
gain to the defendant would be higher than the loss to the plaintiff
from exclusion, since the defendant would obtain monopoly rents
and the plaintiff only a share of the market at the competitive price.
But since the damages would be trebled and attorney's fees added, it
would take a highly inelastic demand curve for the predator to ensure
that the expected monopoly profits could offset potential damages
and attorney's fees. Further, as discussed above, if courts or juries ex-
184 See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
EcON. 169 (1968) (providing an economic approach to the optimal level of law enforce-
ment). On the reasons for the treble damages multiplier, see A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION,
MONOGRAPH No. 13, TREBLE-DAMAGES REMEDY 16-21 (1986); Cavanagh, supra note 20;
Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives, 97 MICH.
L. REv. 2185, 2189-94 (1999); Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble" Damages Really Single
Damages?, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 115 (1993); William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust
Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 652 (1983); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Detrebling Versus Decoupling
Antitrust Damages: Lessons from the Theory of Enforcement, 74 GEO. L.J. 1231 (1986); Steven C.
Salop & Lawrence J. White, Treble Damages Reform: Implications of the Georgetown Project, 55
ANTITRUST L.J. 73 (1986).
185 See, e.g., supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
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hibit leniency toward plaintiffs in computing damages,18 6 defendants
may expect to see inflated damages calculations.
Given the legal status quo, unless the substantive legal standards
are significantly wrong or the adjudication system is systematically bi-
ased in favor of false negatives, predatory pricing would seem to be
generally unprofitable conduct. It is thus not surprising that so few
plaintiffs prevail in predatory pricing cases.' 8 7 There probably are not
very many cases of bona fide predatory pricing given the incentives
created by the Sherman Act and the courts. Even if Chicago School
adherents like Bork, Easterbrook, and McGee are wrong to suppose
that predatory pricing would rarely, 188 if ever, occur in an unregulated
state, predatory pricing is unlikely to occur frequently, given the likeli-
hood of detection and thus a costly lawsuit, as well as the potential
treble damages remedy.
Now consider the firm's incentives in Scenario B-an innocent
price cut by a dominant firm in reaction to new entry. Whether the
firm decides to cut its price is a function of (i) the likelihood that it
will be wrongly sued for predatory pricing, (ii) the expected costs of
the suit (including both costs that are independent of the ultimate
outcome and the possibility of an erroneous adverse judgment), and
(iii) the profits that the firm will earn if it cuts its price.
As to (i), many nonpredatory price cuts by firms with a large mar-
ket share give rise to unmeritorious lawsuits, some of which are dis-
missed early in the litigation, but many of which are dismissed only at
the summary judgment stage after many litigation costs have already
been incurred. 8 9 The unmeritorious lawsuit is particularly likely to
arise where the dominant firm has achieved economies of scale or
other efficiencies that a new entrant has not achieved, and thus the
price cut threatens the profitability of the new entrant.190 By filing
the predatory pricing suit against the dominant firm, the new entrant
borrows sufficient time to become viable. 19' The strategic benefits of
predatory litigation probably increase the incidence of predation suits
that are unlikely to succeed on the merits. Hence, the dominant but
186 See supra text accompanying notes 40-44.
187 See Bolton et al., supra note 8, at 2258-59 (discussing poor success rate of predatory
pricing cases in the last decade).
188 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 1 (arguing that predation should be unregulated because
predatory pricing is rare).
189 Bolton et al., supra note 8, at 2259-60.
190 Edlin sees the incumbent firm's greater economies of scale as a reason to prohibit
price cuts for twelve to eighteen months following the new firm's entry. See Edlin, supra
note 8, at 968-69. Elhauge responds that the incumbent's price cuts may be justified as a
response to the fact that the new entry disrupts optimal price-discrimination schemes and
lowers the incumbent firm's efficiency. Elhauge, supra note 25, at 745-46.
191 See Edlin, supra note 8, at 965 (stating that the new entrant needs time to recover
entry costs and become viable).
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innocent firm that considers cutting its price in response to new com-
petition must take into account the very real possibility of an unmer-
itorious predation suit.
As to factors (ii) and (iii), the costs of false positives to the defen-
dant are high-leniency in proof of damages, which are then trebled,
and attorney's fees.1 92 By lowering its price, the defendant will only
obtain profits at a competitive rate of return since the price cut is not
one that creates monopoly power. In order for the price cut to create
an expectation of profits, the expected profits from the increase in
sales must exceed the expected probability of the suit times the cost of
defending the suit plus the probability-adjusted costs of an adverse
judgment. Since litigation costs and the costs of an adverse judgment
are many times larger than the profits from the price cut, even rela-
tively small likelihoods of suit and of an adverse judgment can give the
price cut a negative expected value.
These two scenarios suggest that, given the current legal status
quo, predatory pricing is highly unlikely to occur, while predatory
pricing law is likely to chill procompetitive price cutting in many
cases. The next question is whether firms' preferences with respect to
risk, the uncertainty of adjudication, and the presence of systematic
directional biases in the adjudication of predatory pricing cases ame-
liorate or aggravate predatory pricing law's tendency to create devia-
tions from socially optimal marginal cost pricing.
2. Unpredictability, Risk Aversion, and Adjudicatory Error
Predatory pricing litigation is an unpredictable enterprise. The
legal standards governing predation claims require examination of
complex economic facts, such as whether costs exceeded revenues
and whether defendant would have been able to recoup the costs of
below-cost pricing. 193 Even tests meant to provide clear guidance on
permissible and impermissible pricing behavior leave open significant
space for adjudicatory ambiguity. For example, Areeda and Turner's
average variable cost test194 is often thought to meet Areeda's admoni-
tion that antitrust rules should provide "clarity [that] guides conduct,
simplifies planning, minimizes conflict, [and] reduces resort to the
courts."195 But the meaning of the average variable cost test is not as
clear, either in concept or application, as Areeda and Turner might
have hoped; there is secondary literature by prominent economists on
192 See supra text accompanying notes 40-46.
193 SeeBrooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-23
(1993).
194 Areeda & Turner, supra note 25, at 716-18.
195 Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Law as Industrial Policy: Should Judges andJuries Make It?, in
ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS 29, 42 (Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece
eds., 1992).
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what it means for a cost to be fixed or variable.1 9 6 Further, determin-
ing which costs are fixed or variable in a particular case requires com-
plex expert testimony.19 7 Other proposed legal frameworks for
adjudicating predatory pricing claims tend to be even more complex
and create even greater adjudicatory uncertainty. 198
The structure of predatory pricing law does not provide business
executives a high degree of certainty about the legal reception of
price cuts. The social welfare effects of this uncertainty are not neces-
sarily negative-uncertainty could keep firms from straying too close
to the line.19 9 But predatory pricing is not like many forms of tortious
conduct where discouraging activity on the borders of illegality is so-
cially beneficial because the borderline activity is of low social value.2 00
On the contrary, price cuts that drive prices down toward marginal
cost are of high social value. They create ever-increasing gains until
they reach the tipping point where they exclude competitors and
threaten to cause long-run price increases.
Risk aversion also contributes to firm behavior with respect to
price cuts. Even if the likelihood that the firm will be condemned as a
predator is relatively low, given the inherent uncertainty in the law of
predation, it is a possibility that relatively few dominant firms can rule
196 See, e.g., William J. Baumol, Predation and the Logic of the Average Variable Cost Test, 39
J.L. & ECON. 49 (1996) (concluding that any individual price that is not below the average
variable cost is not predatory, if variable costs are understood as avoidable costs).
197 McGahee v. N. Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1504 n.38 (11th Cir. 1988) ("When
average variable cost is appropriate to use, as well as determining what costs are variable, is
an issue of fact requiring expert testimony."); Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Parcel
Serv. of Am., 651 F.2d 122, 131 (2d Cir. 1981) (rejecting plaintiffs argument that defen-
dant priced below average variable cost where plaintiff failed to present expert testimony
to this effect).
198 For example, Edlin defends his proposed test requiring the incumbent firm not to
cut its prices for twelve to eighteen months following entry by a new firm that prices at least
20% below the incumbent's price on the grounds that it eliminates complex price-quality
comparisons and would be more easily administrable. See Edlin, supra note 8, at 949.
Elhauge argues that Edlin's rule would create significant new complexities and difficulties
of administration. See Elhauge, supra note 25, at 808-21.
199 See generally John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compli-
ance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REv. 965 (1984) (arguing that uncertainty in a legal
standard will induce individuals to overcomply in order to reduce the chance of being held
liable).
200 There may be circumstances where vagueness in liability rules or remedial schemes
are superior to predictable rules in deterring undesirable conduct. See Tom Baker et al.,
The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA L. REv. 443, 449-68
(2004) (using experiments to show that uncertainty in sanctioning increases deterrence).
Predatory pricing is not one of these circumstances, because the undesirable conduct is so
intertwined with highly desirable conduct. See generally RiCHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 243-44 (5th ed. 1998) (arguing that one reason for a ceiling on criminal
punishments is because "a savage penalty will induce people to forgo socially desirable
activities at the borderline of the criminal activity").
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out.20 1 Risk aversion also should affect the incidence of predatory
price cuts. 20 2 Managers may be averse to predation strategies both
because the chances of successful recoupment are remote, even if the
competitor is excluded, and because the probability of detection and
an adverse judgment is relatively high. That is to say, predation is a
risky strategy in an unregulated state and an even riskier strategy in a
regulated state. If losing money in a failed predation strategy and los-
ing money in a large adverse judgment are both psychologically per-
ceived to be risks, then managers may exhibit a bias against predation
strategies that have a positive expected value. 20 3 Thus, while risk aver-
sion may decrease the probability that managers will engage in preda-
tory pricing, it may also increase the costs of predatory pricing law by
increasing the probability that managers will forgo nonpredatory
price cuts. If managers are sufficiently risk averse, then heavy penal-
ties for predatory pricing may cause substantial social harm by reduc-
ing the need to deter predatory pricing and increasing the chilling of
innocent price cuts.
Are the corporate managers for dominant firms-the ones mostly
likely to engage in predatory pricing or be chilled by predatory pric-
ing law from cutting prices-likely to be significantly risk averse?
Dominant firms are generally diversified and are therefore unlikely to
be institutionally risk averse.20 4 But pricing decisions for particular
products are often made by managers with responsibility for only the
particular products at issue, not the firm's overall portfolio. Those
managers are likely to be risk averse with respect to pricing decisions
that affect their personal compensation and reputation within the
firm. The firm may try to overcome this agency cost by aligning the
managers' interests with the firm's interest by giving the managers
stock options and long-term employment contracts. Whether such
201 See Calfee & Craswell, supra note 199 (showing that uncertainty about the legal
consequences of conduct and risk aversion can lead to suboptimal behavior).
202 See Harry S. Gerla, The Psychology of Predatory Pricing. Why Predatory Pricing Pays, 39
Sw. L.J. 755, 760-65 (1985) (arguing that when facing new entrants, risk-averse managers
tend to opt for inaction that leads to small but certain losses).
203 Gerla argues that managers in the dominant firm facing new entrants may see not
engaging in predatory pricing as a risky strategy because taking no action will result in a
loss of market share. See id. at 761-62; see also Harry S. Gerla, A Micro-Microeconomic Ap-
proach to Antitrust Law: Games Managers Play, 86 MICH. L. REv. 892, 906-07 n.69 (1988)
(discussing manager behavior in the antitrust context); Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk
Preference, and the Law, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1115, 1154-55 (2003) (discussing Gerla's man-
ager-focused approach to firm conduct in the antitrust context). But, in analyzing man-
ager's incentives in considering price cuts, it is not sufficient to focus on gains or losses in
the market. Expected gains or losses arising by virtue of predatory pricing law itself must
also be considered in formulating an optimal legal regime with respect to predatory
pricing.
204 ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMics 558-59 (6th ed.
2005) (discussing risk preferences and corporate diversification strategies).
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compensation structuring occurs at a sufficient level to overcome indi-
vidual managers' risk aversion is uncertain. John Lott's empirical
study found no significant difference between the executive compen-
sation structures of firms accused of predation and those of compara-
ble firms not accused of predation. 20 5 Lott also found that firms do
not structure compensation packages to reward managers for preda-
tory behavior. 20 6 By the same token, there is no reason to believe that
dominant firms provide their executives with strong incentives to en-
gage in nonpredatory, but nonetheless legally risky, price cuts.
A final factor to consider is whether there is a systematic bias in
the judicial structuring of predatory pricing law or in the adjudication
of predatory pricing cases toward either false positives or false nega-
tives. Here, the biases of factfinders and judges may tend in opposite
directions.
It would surely be surprising to find that jurors actually under-
stand the substance of predatory pricing law, when the very definition
of predation and its elements have long been, and continue to be,
debated by the brightest minds in both economics and law. Arthur
Austin's interviews of jurors in four antitrust trials, including Brooke
Group, revealed that "the jurors were overwhelmed, frustrated, and
confused by testimony well beyond their comprehension.... [A] t no
time did any juror grasp-even at the margins-the law, the econom-
ics, or any other testimony relating to the allegations or defense."20 7
Austin reports:
[A]t no time have I ever encountered a juror who had the foggiest
notion of what oligopoly, market power, or average variable costs
meant, much less how they applied to the case. Typical is the re-
sponse I received when I asked a juror whether he remembered
average variable cost. The juror replied, "Yes, explain it to me. I still
don't know what it means." 20 8
Based on his study of the Brooke Group jury, Austin concluded that the
jury's verdict for Liggett was based upon sentiments inflamed by a
"smoking gun" document from Brown & Williamson's files "in which
B&W executives made comments like 'bury them' and 'put a lid on
Liggett.' "209
If jurors are unable to understand the economic requirements of
predatory pricing law, then they largely have nothing but a "morality
play" involving a dominant firm, often with superior resources and
205 JOHN R. LOTT, JR., ARE PREDATORY COMMITMENTS CREDIBLE? 36-49 (1999).
206 Id. at 49.
207 Arthur Austin, The Juy System at Risk from Complexity, the New Media and Deviancy, 73
DENV. U. L. REv. 51, 54 (1995).
208 Id.
209 Id. at 56.
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files full of smoking gun documents that Posner calls "compelling evi-
dence of predatory intent to the naive," 210 and a smaller, often
younger firm that has been "damaged" by the dominant firm's behav-
ior. Although the damage may have resulted from socially beneficial
price competition or the smaller, younger firm's comparative ineffi-
ciency, it may be that all the jurors understand or care about is that
the defendant is a large corporation that damaged a smaller corpora-
tion through a series of tactical price cuts.
The Supreme Court's Matsushita decision, 211 which directs dis-
trict courts to play a strong gatekeeping role in antitrust cases in gen-
eral and predatory pricing cases in particular, evinces a deep
suspicion that antitrust juries will be systematically biased against dom-
inant firms and aggressive pricing behavior. Matsushita invites district
courts in the first instance, and courts of appeal in the second, to scru-
tinize the economic logic of predatory pricing cases and only permit
theoretically sound cases to proceed to the jury.212 Several courts of
appeals have interpreted Matsushita and subsequent cases as creating
a presumption against predatory pricing claims. 213 Matsushita thus
creates a counterweight to anticorporate jury tendencies in the form
of heightened judicial scrutiny of plaintiffs' predatory pricing claims.
This gatekeeping function is separate from the courts' obligation to
specify the liability rules governing predation claims. Even if the
courts have specified the optimal norms defining predatory and non-
predatory behavior, they may still exhibit a systematic bias against pre-
dation claims in their role as arbiters of the plausibility of predatory
pricing in particular cases.
This state of affairs leaves, finally, the question of whether U.S.
courts-the Supreme Court in particular-exhibit any systematic bias
in the creation of liability rules governing predatory pricing. It is diffi-
cult to answer this question without engaging the highly contested de-
bate over what should count as predatory or nonpredatory, because
one's view of the Court's bias will be largely informed by what one
210 POSNER, supra note 25, at 215.
211 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
212 See generally Wesley J. Liebeler, Whither Predatory Pricing: From Areeda and Turner to
Matsushita, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1052, 1054 (1986) ("[A]lmost all of the predatory
pricing cases that have come before the courts since 1975 could have been decided sum-
marily for the defendant under the standards set forth in Matsushita"); James L. Warren &
Mary B. Cranston, Summary Judgment After Matsushita, ANTITRUST, Summer 1987, at 12,
12-13 (describing the Matsushita court's stringent gatekeeping standards).
213 See, e.g., Advo, Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1196 (3d Cir. 1995)
("Matsushita... created a legal presumption, based on economic logic, that predatory pricing
is unlikely to threaten competition."); Stitt Spark Plug Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co.,
840 F.2d 1253, 1255 (5th Cir. 1988) ( "The [Matsushita] Court [held] that the economic
disincentives to predatory pricing often will justify a presumption that an allegation of such
behavior is implausible.").
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thinks of the Court's precedents. Further, if there is a bias toward
underinclusion, it may be an artifact of judicial concern that preda-
tory pricing lawsuits could chill vigorous price competition and be
used strategically by competitors. 2 14 It is possible that the courts are
unbiased in their diagnosis of what conduct is predatory, but never-
theless deliberately tend in the direction of underinclusion following
crude intuitions about the likely effects of predation rules on price
competition. If so, then the observed bias against predation claims
should not count as error, but rather as a deliberate structuring of
predatory pricing law to minimize social costs by allowing some margi-
nal cases of predation to go unremedied.
There is no reason to believe that the Supreme Court shares the
biases ofjuries, or the corrective biases of lower courts, in its creation
of predatory pricing rules. The Court is certainly influenced by
schools of thought and evolving attitudes toward the robustness of
markets-the Chicago School has undoubtedly had a significant ef-
fect-but this influence does not equate to a general predisposition to
err in creating liability rules governing predatory pricing. If an ob-
servable adjudicatory bias exists, it is at the level of factfinding and
review of facts, not at the level of the creation of legal norms.
3. Summary of Directional Influences on Pricing Behavior
How far from the socially optimal pricing point-namely, margi-
nal cost or Ramsey pricing-do predatory pricing laws induce market
pricing to stray? Taken together, the various factors discussed above
suggest that predatory pricing laws induce a substantial deviation from
optimal pricing. To summarize, predation is likely to be detected if it
occurs, and antitrust law, with the treble-damages remedy, fee shifting,
and liberality in proving damages, provides a heavy sanction if it is.
The incentives to engage in predatory pricing-namely, monopoly
profits-would have to be enormous to overcome these disincentives
to predate. Furthermore, the strategic benefits to plaintiffs of preda-
tory pricing litigation and the magnitude of recoverable damages in-
duce many plaintiffs to file meritless predation suits. Even if
plaintiffs' likelihood of success is small, defendants have strong incen-
tives to forgo price cutting both because the costs of defending a mer-
itless suit are large and also because even a small probability of an
adverse judgment translates into a significant expected cost given the
magnitude of possible damages. Predicting the outcome of a preda-
tory pricing lawsuit is difficult given the inherent complexity in the
legal standard and in adjudication. Adjudicatory uncertainty coupled
with risk aversion may lead potential predators to forgo predation and
214 See supra text accompanying notes 5-7.
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potential innocent price cutters to forgo price cuts. Finally, there is
almost certainly a systematic jury bias against dominant firms that en-
gage in aggressive price cutting, which the Matsushita gatekeeping
function of the courts may or may not correct.
Most of these factors point toward the conclusion that if preda-
tory pricing liability rules drew a line at exactly the dividing point be-
tween socially beneficial and socially harmful price discounting, they
would induce more deviation from optimal pricing than necessary in
order to deter predation and would chill many socially beneficial
price cuts. In theory, at least, even a very modest form of predatory
pricing law might deter socially costly behavior, but a more robust
form of predatory pricing law might backfire by chilling aggressive but
beneficial pricing behavior. Before considering normative conclu-
sions about the optimal content and structure of predatory pricing
law, however, it is worth considering the extent to which theoretical
considerations track the influence of predatory pricing law on busi-
ness culture and practice.
C. Results of In-House Counsel Survey on Influence of
Predatory Pricing Law
The literature on predatory pricing law, whether supportive of
less or more governmental intervention, generally evinces the assump-
tion that the specification of predatory pricing legal norms will affect
the ways in which firms set prices. Those who believe that predatory
pricing is relatively common and effective at quashing competition as-
sume that a more aggressive regulatory norm would discourage firms
from embarking on predatory campaigns. Those who believe that
predatory pricing is relatively uncommon and ineffective believe that
the existence of predatory pricing laws induces firms to forgo benefi-
cial price cuts out of fear of getting sued. But what if predatory pric-
ing law, as interpreted by the courts, rarely works its way into the
decision-making processes of executives charged with pricing deci-
sions and instead only appears as an ex post revelation when a firm's
lawyers advise it to sue? Then predatory pricing law would have
neither a general deterrent effect on predators nor a chilling effect on
nonpredators.
Business schools teach little, if anything, about antitrust law in
general, 215 and probably particularly little about predatory pricing,
which is a specialized and often misunderstood field within antitrust.
If business executives are responsive to the incentives that predatory
pricing law creates, it is usually because in-house lawyers communicate
215 Lawrence J. White, Microeconomics and Antitrust in MBA Programs: What's Thought,
What's Taught, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 87, 92 (2003) (describing the antitrust-related curric-
ula of major business schools).
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those incentives. To gather data on the extent to which predatory
pricing law affects actual business decisions, I conducted a survey of
in-house counsel asking a series of questions about the extent to
which predatory pricing law is communicated to business executives
responsible for pricing decisions.216 Although the response rate was
poor, the responses given provide some modestly useful information
about the influence of predatory pricing law on executive decision
making.
In January of 2005, I sent a twenty-five question questionnaire to
919 in-house lawyers selected from the Martindale-Hubbell directory
of corporate counsel.2 1 7 I selected only one attorney per corporation,
and I instructed respondents to restrict their responses to matters re-
lated to their current employers. I excluded corporations that were
highly unlikely ever to encounter predatory pricing issues, such as
rate-regulated firms, nonprofit corporations, industry associations,
and holding companies. Where possible, I selected the addressee at-
torney based on a description of the attorney's job functions that in-
cluded antitrust matters. Since most in-house counsel rosters do not
list individuals with antitrust responsibilities,2 18 I sent the survey to
many lawyers who might not have any antitrust responsibility and were
therefore unlikely to respond.
Seventy in-house attorneys sent back the questionnaire.2 19 All but
two identified themselves as individuals responsible for antitrust mat-
ters and provided useable responses. While this 8% response rate is
low and places limits on the conclusions that one can draw from the
responses, there is reason to believe that the respondents represent a
more significant proportion of the in-house attorneys with exposure
to predatory pricing matters than the general pool of all in-house law-
yers: The majority of the respondents work for manufacturing (42%),
wholesale (9%), or retail (6%) companies. Further, the majority of
the respondents work for large corporations-59% had over $1 bil-
lion in annual revenues and 29% had between $200 million and $1
billion in annual revenues. The attorneys who responded were proba-
bly more willing than the general population of in-house attorneys to
fill out the questionnaire because their firms did face predatory pric-
ing matters. This probable response bias suggests that the survey re-
sults provide little information on the effects of predatory pricing law
216 Questionnaire from Daniel Crane, Assistant Professor of Law, Cardozo Law School,
to In-House Counsel (Jan. 2005) (on file with author).
217 Id. The Martindale Hubble directory is available at http://www.martindale.com/
xp/Martindale/LawyerLocator/SearchLawyerLocator/corp-search.xml.
218 Many smaller corporate law departments probably have no one with antitrust ex-
pertise, particularly if the firm seldom faces antitrust matters.
219 See Results of Questionnaire from Daniel Crane, Assistant Professor of Law, Car-
dozo Law School, to In-House Counsel (Apr. 2005) (on file with author).
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on corporations generally;220 they may, however, reflect the situation
in large corporations of the kind that are likely to be affected by pred-
atory pricing law.
I designed a series of questions in the questionnaire to uncover
the extent to which in-house lawyers communicate with business exec-
utives about predatory pricing law in nonlitigation circumstances. 221
Seventy-eight percent of respondents reported that their firms had
formalized antitrust compliance manuals or policies. Of the firms
that had such policies, a majority-65%-had policies with respect to
predatory pricing. A similar majority of respondents-66%-re-
ported that they or other lawyers acting on behalf of their companies
had provided advice to business executives about predatory pricing
matters. Overall, only 9% of respondents' firms had ever been in-
volved in predatory pricing litigation, which may suggest that informa-
tion about predatory pricing is frequently communicated to business
executives in nonlitigation contexts.
A related series of questions in the questionnaire sought informa-
tion about the content of the predatory pricing advice provided to
business executives. In particular, I was interested to learn the extent
to which in-house lawyers provide advice on the appropriate measure
of cost below which prices should not be set. Of the firms that have
an antitrust compliance manual that contains a provision about preda-
tory pricing, only 32% had manuals that contained information about
what measure of cost should be considered in setting prices. Of those,
five firm policy manuals establish "cost," without further description,
as the appropriate measure, three establish "average variable cost" as
the appropriate measure, and four adopt some other, unspecified
measure of cost. When the surveyed lawyers gave direct advice to busi-
ness executives on predatory pricing, as opposed merely to including
it in a policy manual, they were more likely to give instruction on the
appropriate measure of cost. Seventy-one percent of the time they
gave advice on the appropriate measure of cost. Thirty-two percent of
the lawyers advised that "cost" without further description was the ap-
propriate measure, 19% advised that "average variable cost" was ap-
propriate, and the remainder advised that some other measure of cost
was appropriate.
220 Indeed, the vast majority of corporations are unlikely ever to confront a predatory
pricing issue because there is no dominant firm in their market or because their industry
cost structure does not lend itself to predation or predation claims.
221 Predatory pricing was defined in the questionnaire to include "any claim that a
price was too low and therefore exclusionary of competition." See Questionnaire from
Daniel Crane, supra note 216. International dumping claims were excluded from this defi-
nition. In order to exclude responses concerning the pre-Matsushita and Brooke Group era,
respondents were instructed to limit their responses to matters within the past fifteen years.
See id.
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Another line of questions sought to elicit information relevant to
a theoretical claim made earlier in this paper-namely, that firms can
strategically misuse predatory pricing law to chill price competition. I
asked respondents: "Has your company ever received a communica-
tion (whether formal or informal) from a competitor or other com-
pany to the effect that your company was charging a predatory price?"
Nineteen percent responded "yes," 78% responded "no," and 3% re-
sponded that they did not know. Interestingly, litigation followed the
predatory pricing complaint only 54% of the time, which is consistent
with the view that firms may seek to stymie price competition by
merely invoking predatory pricing law in response to a competitor's
price cuts. 222 I also asked the respondents whether their own company
had ever complained to a competitor that its prices were predatory.
Seven percent stated affirmatively that their companies had done so,
32% stated that they did not know, and 61% stated that their company
had not. Only one respondent had ever received a predatory pricing
complaint from the government.
A follow-up question asked the respondents who had received a
competitor complaint whether the complaint had resulted in the re-
spondent's company charging a higher price. Only one out of twelve
respondents who had received a competitor complaint believed that it
had resulted in their company charging higher prices. The entire
group of respondents was also asked whether they believed that the
existence of a predatory pricing offense had any effect on the manner
in which their company set its prices. Seventeen percent answered
"yes," 76% answered "no," and 7% said they did not know. A follow-
up question to those who believed that predatory pricing law had af-
fected the manner in which their company set prices asked whether it
had resulted in higher prices, lower prices, or simply "differently" set
prices. Only three out of ten respondents chose "higher"; the other
seven chose "differently."223 The respondents were also asked
whether they believed that predatory pricing law had any effect on the
way in which their competitors priced. Only four respondents said
"yes"; the others split between "no" (50%) and "don't know" (44%).
222 A further series of questions in the questionnaire sought information on the out-
come of litigation if any did occur. In the six cases where private litigation occurred, the
defendant won summary judgment four times, one case ended in a settlement, and one
case resulted in some other, unspecified outcome. See Results Questionnaire from Daniel
Crane, supra note 219.
223 The implications of the "differently" response are unclear. Most likely, respon-
dents who chose this category were unwilling to commit to the view that their firms had
charged higher prices as a result of predatory pricing law, although they had seen evidence
that the firm had restructured some pricing scheme-for example, by eliminating a price
discrimination mechanism or a bundled rebate program-in response to predatory pric-
ing law.
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Although the poor response rate and small response pool limit
the conclusions that can be drawn, the responses suggest the follow-
ing tentative observations: At least some rudiments of predatory pric-
ing law are broadly communicated to executives in large corporations
involved in pricing decisions in manufacturing, retail, and wholesale
industries. Not surprisingly, given the division among lower courts on
the appropriate measure of cost governing predation claims, the ad-
vice given to corporate executives often does not include specification
of a particular cost threshold below which revenues must not fall. Al-
though some firms have adopted average variable cost as the presump-
tive standard, the advice usually appears to be more general.
Competitor complaints about aggressive pricing are not pervasive, but
occur with some regularity. They result in litigation only about half of
the time but may have effects on pricing even when litigation does not
occur. Finally, it is difficult for in-house lawyers to find a direct causal
relationship between predatory pricing law and higher prices. Pricing
decisions are complex and multifaceted, and even when predatory
pricing law induces a firm to change its pricing structure, it will not
always be clear that a net price increase results.
Missing from this survey is one critical question that the respon-
dents would not have been in a position to answer objectively: whether
their firms had ever considered or actually engaged in predatory pric-
ing. If they had, the competitor threats that never resulted in litiga-
tion may count as a virtue and the counseling about predatory pricing
may have beneficial effects. This question is hard to answer as long as
the definition of predation remains unsettled and the economic at-
tributes of exclusion and recoupment highly contested. The most
that surveys of this kind can tell us is that predatory pricing law has a
high or low degree of influence on business behavior. Whatever the
answer to that question, one must still determine what degree of influ-
ence on pricing behavior is optimal given the constraints inherent in
adjudication. To that question we turn in the final Part.
III
OPTIMAL PREDATORY PRICING POLICY IN LIGHT OF
MARKET EFFECTS
Although much has been written about predatory pricing law and
the courts have developed a complex body of governing law, many of
the hardest and most fundamental questions await conclusive answers.
Are predation theories available only to equally or more efficient com-
petitors, or can less efficient competitors whose efficiency develop-
ment was stymied by predation also assert claims?224 What is the
224 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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appropriate measure of cost below which prices cannot be set?225
Does predation necessarily entail the sacrifice of short-run profits, or
is predation without sacrifice possible?2 26 Do the same predation
rules apply to multiproduct discounting as to single product discount-
ing?227 These questions were largely unanswered following the first
wave of predatory pricing scholarship in the 1970s and early 1980s
and the Supreme Court decisions confronting this issue in the late
1980s and early 1990s, which adopted the Chicago School perspective
that predation was rare and predation theory a threat to robust price
competition. 228 Answers to these questions are being, and will con-
tinue to be, formulated in the courts and in legal scholarship in a
second wave of predatory pricing theory. The second wave of scholar-
ship and judicial development is likely to draw on advances in eco-
nomic theory, particularly in behavioral economics and game
theory, 229 and these influences may push courts in a direction of
greater receptiveness to predation claims.
But even if evolving theoretical insights show predation to be a
more common and effective strategy than some had thought, that is
an insufficient ground to justify a more robust predatory pricing doc-
trine. In light of the features of antitrust law and management deci-
sion-making that cause predatory pricing law to induce deviations
from socially optimal pricing, any movement toward strengthening
predation theory must be justified by the creation of net efficiency
gains and not merely deterrence of some additional instances of pre-
dation. Indeed, even the anemic status quo may go too far if the inno-
cent price cutting it deters, coupled with the costs of predatory
225 See, e.g., supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
226 For a theoretical defense of the sacrifice test, see Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D.
Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8
(1981). A number of courts have accepted that profit sacrifice is a necessary condition for
unlawful predation. See Barr Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 978 F.2d 98, 109 (3d Cir. 1992)
( "[P]redatory intent reflects a competitor's willingness to sacrifice present revenues in or-
der to achieve monopoly profits in the future." (citing 0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659
F.2d 340, 348 (3d Cir. 1981))); Ne. Tel. Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel., 651 F.2d 76, 86 (2d Cir.
1981) (defining predatory pricing as requiring sacrifice of present revenues); AD/SAT v.
Associated Press, 920 F. Supp. 1287, 1301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same), affd, 181 F.3d 216 (2d
Cir. 1999). A growing number of commentators question the soundness of the sacrifice
criterion. See Edlin, supra note 8, at 945-49 (describing theory of predation without sacri-
fice of short-run profits); Elhauge, supra note 176, at 271-72 (criticizing reliance on sacri-
fice notions to define predation); Andrew I. Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution Strategies by
Dominant Firms: Striking a Better Balance, 72 A-NTrITRUST L.J. 3, 56 (2004) (criticizing sacrifice
theory of predation).
227 See, e.g., Crane, supra note 12 (discussing multiproduct discounting in the antitrust
context).
228 See supra text accompanying notes 5-7.
229 See generally Bolton et al., supra note 8 (developing predatory pricing models using
signaling and other strategic-behavior theories); Tor, supra note 8 (applying behavioral
theories to predatory pricing).
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pricing counseling and litigation, exceeds the costs of predatory price
cutting deterred by the existing legal rules.
It is not my purpose here to propose an optimal legal test for
predation. Rather, this final Part addresses two different categories of
rules that could be applied or modified to alleviate the adverse market
effects of predation law. The first set of rules specify decisional crite-
ria courts and antitrust agencies could employ (and perhaps already
do, to some extent) in framing predatory pricing liability rules. The
second set of rules are ancillary to the substance of predation law and
relate to the remedial aspects of predatory pricing litigation in the
United States.
A. Decisional Rules
When judges or antitrust regulators are called upon to determine
liability rules that may condemn prices as too low, or to determine
that a particular firm's pricing behavior was predatory, they wander
into a thicket of complex economic theories and dense factual
records. The likelihood that they will emerge from that thicket with a
pristine set of rules or adjudicatory results creating the right incen-
tives to drive prices toward marginal cost is low. Before entering the
thicket, courts and regulatory agencies can choose decisional rules
that serve as precommitment strategies to minimize the costs of errors
and unintended effects. 23 0 I suggest three such decisional rules for
predatory pricing cases.
1. Deliberate Underinclusion in Liability Rules
The over- or underinclusiveness of predatory pricing rules is a
frequent topic in scholarship on predation. Aaron Edlin observes,
"When setting a legal standard intended to distinguish procompetitive
from anticompetitive low prices, courts must balance the possibility of
being underinclusive against that of being overinclusive."'23 1 Edlin
further argues that "[t]he probabilities of these two types of errors
depend.., upon the underlying plausibility of predatory pricing. '232
But underinclusion need not be an error at all, even if predatory pric-
ing is plausible and frequent. Herbert Hovenkamp aptly notes, "Until
antitrust tribunals are able to identify above cost prices as anticompeti-
tive in a reliable manner, a consumer-oriented antitrust policy has no
choice but to adhere to the admittedly underdeterrent below cost
230 Cf Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Crimi
nal Law, 97 HARv. L. REV. 625 (1984) (discussing the choice of initial rules in the criminal
law context).
231 Edlin, supra note 8, at 952.
232 Id.
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pricing requirements of the Areeda-Turner or some similar rule. '233
Underinclusion-prohibiting less than all predatory and socially
costly conduct-could be an optimal decisional strategy if prohibiting
the marginal instances of predation would invite greater strategic mis-
use of predatory pricing law or more self-policed failures to engage in
innocent price cuts. Further, the Supreme Court has quite reasonably
justified its current approach to predatory pricing as deliberately un-
derinclusive, even without regard to the possibility of false positives,
because "above-cost predatory pricing schemes [are] 'beyond the
practical ability of a judicial tribunal to control.' "234 Even if the exact
line separating predation from beneficial price cuts could be identi-
fied with analytical precision, courts would be ill-advised to draw the
legal line in the same place as the analytical line if the collateral costs
to the legal line drawing were great.
Suppose that a court could identify with absolute precision that
in x circumstances a price cut would be socially costly in the long run
because of its exclusionary impact on competitors. For reasons dis-
cussed in Part II, specifying x as the governing legal norm would not
be the optimal solution given the structural status quo of antitrust law.
Firms tempted to predate by engaging in x would face strong disincen-
tives to do so, given the inherent riskiness of predation strategies, the
high likelihood of detection, treble damages, leniency in proof of the
amount of damages, mandatory unilateral fee shifting, the costs of de-
fending a predatory pricing lawsuit, and managerial risk aversion. To
deter firms from engaging in conduct x, it might be sufficient to spec-
ify x + 1 as the liability standard. On the other hand, setting x as the
legal standard would induce innocent price cutters in circumstances x
- 1 and perhaps even x - 5 to forgo socially beneficial price cuts, given
the risk of adjudicatory error,235 the costs of defending even a success-
ful suit to conclusion, and the disproportionate costs in the event of
an adverse judgment. Further, setting the liability rule at exactly x
would provide greater opportunities for firms to use predatory pricing
law strategically to organize tacit collusion schemes than if the liability
rule were set at x + y. Thus, even if a court were absolutely confident
in x as the correct analytical line, setting the substantive liability rule at
x + y would produce a more efficient outcome.
233 Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 314-15.
234 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004)
(quoting Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223
(1993)); see also Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling Pri-
vote Incentives and Public Enforcement Goals, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1, 23 n.88 (1995) (noting that
predatory pricing plaintiffs "must overcome deliberately underinclusive liability rules").
235 The risk of adjudicatory error simply cannot be eliminated by courts, even if courts
have a high degree of confidence in the correctness of the substantive liability rule.
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Courts and antitrust enforcement agencies should adopt a deci-
sional rule with respect to predatory pricing that mandates deliberate
underinclusion in the specification of the liability rule. The degree of
the deliberate underinclusion should be determined not only by the
court's certainty in the soundness of its decision-making but also by an
appreciation of the degree to which predatory pricing law discourages
innocent price cuts. If, as I have suggested here, predatory pricing
law's tendency to induce deviations from optimal pricing is strong,
then the additive factor should be substantial.
2. Deliberate Underinclusion in Adjudication
The underinclusion rule just described would apply to the specifi-
cation of the governing liability rules. A similar set of principles could
be-and may already be-applied to judicial supervision of the adju-
dicatory process. Although liability rules might be thought to operate
on incentives ex ante and adjudicatory rules only ex post, the predic-
tions that business executives make with respect to the outcome of
predatory pricing adjudications will also influence their incentives ex
ante. Particularly if executives perceive-probably with good reason-
that jurors are systematically predisposed to false positives in preda-
tory pricing cases, the effects on price competition could be
deleterious.
As discussed in Part II, Matsushita suggests that the solution to
juror bias is for courts to scrutinize carefully the soundness of preda-
tion theories at the summary judgment stage. While this may work
out to a mandate of deliberate adjudicatory underinclusion of cases
given to juries, there are more explicit ways to achieve the same result.
For example, standards establishing the necessary quantum of evi-
dence can operate to optimally calibrate social behavior when adjust-
ments in the liability rule are inadvisable. 23 6 If there are expressive or
operational constraints on deliberate underinclusion in the specifica-
tion of the liability rule for predatory pricing, then the costs of main-
taining a prohibition on predatory pricing could be minimized by
requiring plaintiffs to prove predation by some heightened quantum
of proof-for example, clear and convincing evidence. 237 Specifying
a heightened quantum of proof would still result in deterrence of
predatory pricing, given the significant costs of an adverse judgment,
and it would make some innocent price cuts less likely to be pre-
cluded by the existence of predatory pricing law.
236 See, e.g., Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. (forth-
coming 2005), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/workshop-papers/
Stein.pdf (online manuscript at 16-17).
237 See id. (online manuscript at 23).
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Both forms of deliberate underinclusion could be used simulta-
neously to create an optimal structure of incentives. For example,
adopting the average variable cost test as a necessary condition for
predation and requiring proof of predation by clear and convincing
evidence might produce superior results even if there were clearly
identifiable instances of above average variable cost predation and
even though the evidentiary rule would sometimes excuse below aver-
age variable cost price cutters.
3. Bright-Line Liability Rules
Ex ante uncertainty over adjudicatory results combined with man-
agerial risk aversion makes it likely that some firms will forgo innocent
price cuts that come close to the predation line, even in the absence
of a competitor's threat to sue. If the predation line is fuzzy, the chil-
ling effects are compounded. As the survey results discussed in Part
II.C reveal, business executives in industries susceptible to predation
and predation claims are being told that they must not price below
cost, but they often are not being told what cost means. If the aca-
demic and judicial debates over the conceptualization of predation
have shown anything, it is that the differences between various possi-
ble cost standards are highly significant. If business executives are in-
ternalizing the general predation advice they are given, they could be
led to self-police according to a widely varying range of interpretations
of what predation means.
Despite its concern over chilling vigorous price competition, the
Supreme Court has been reticent to establish a bright-line cost stan-
dard. Three times it has declined to adopt a specific measure of
cost.23 8 Although these specific cases could be justified on the
grounds that the cost issue was not directly presented, 239 the Court
has also shown no interest in granting certiorari in cases where the
issue was squarely presented.240 The Supreme Court's reticence to es-
tablish bright-line predation standards is not limited to the question
of the appropriate cost measure. The Court recently denied certiorari
in a case involving the appropriate treatment of bundled rebates-a
form of multiproduct price discounting-after the Solicitor General,
Justice Department, and Federal Trade Commission advised that it
would be better to deny certiorari because the issues presented were
238 See supra note 10.
239 For example, in Brooke Group the parties agreed that average variable cost was the
appropriate measure. See 509 U.S. at 222 n.1. This is as one would expect given that Phil-
lip Areeda represented Liggett and Robert Bork represented Brown & Williamson. See id.
at 211.
240 See Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Ad. Richfield Co., 146 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 1017 (1998); Int'l Travel Arrangers v. NWA, Inc., 991 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 932 (1993).
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"novel and difficult" and because the Third Circuit's en banc "ruling
does not conflict with the decisions of any other court of appeals."241
A policy favoring incremental decision-making, lengthy incuba-
tion of experimentation in the lower courts, and multifactored balanc-
ing tests may be appropriate in many circumstances, but these are
poor strategies for the administration of a predatory pricing regime.
Uncertainty over the governing legal standards imposes barriers to ef-
ficient price competition. Particularly given the desirability of under-
inclusion, the courts should precommit to draw bright-line,
underinclusive predation rules at the earliest opportunity. Examples
of desirable predation rules include complete immunity against pre-
dation claims for firms with market shares below particular thresholds,
per se legality for prices above the specified cost threshold, and well-
defined safe harbors for mixed bundling schemes.242
Given the uncertainty costs of predation law and the glacial pace
of Supreme Court rulemaking in antitrust, it is doubtful that the crea-
tion of predation liability rules through incremental common-law de-
velopment is desirable. Agency rulemaking of prospective pricing
rules would be superior, although neither the Justice Department nor
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) currently has the statutory au-
thority to make predation rules that would apply to private predation
lawsuits, the primary source of concern. 243 If the predatory pricing
cause of action is to be maintained, Congress should consider delegat-
ing such rulemaking authority to the FTC.
Bright-line rules are not a panacea in predation law. As discussed
above, even when the cost standard is clearly articulated, its meaning
and application is complex and uncertain. However, a greater degree
of clarity in the specification of the predation offense would be a ben-
eficial incremental step toward minimizing the chilling effects of pre-
dation law.
B. Remedial Rules
Much of the reason that predation law exerts a pull away from
optimal pricing, requiring the suggested adjustments to liability and
adjudicatory rules suggested above, has to do with the remedial struc-
ture of U.S. antitrust law. In particular, the treble damages remedy,
241 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, 3M Co. v. LePage's Inc., 540 U.S.
807, cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2932 (May 28, 2004) (No. 02-1865), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
cases/f203900/203900.pdf.
242 See, e.g., Thomas A. Lambert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1688
(2005) (discussing possible theories of predatory pricing in the bundled discounts
context).
243 The FTC has the authority to promulgate substantive competition rules, although
any such rules would not apply to private lawsuits under the Sherman Act. See Nat'l Petro-
leum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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unilateral fee shifting, competitor enforcement, and liberal discovery
rules provide opportunities for abuse. Alterations of some of these
features of antitrust law in predatory pricing cases could have signifi-
cant positive effects without losing the primary deterrent value of
predatory pricing law.
1. Eliminating the Treble Damages Remedy
The incentive dislocations caused by the treble damages remedy
in predatory pricing cases have long been observed. 244 As discussed in
Part II.B, the traditional justifications for the treble damages remedy
in antitrust have little force as applied to predatory pricing, which is
unlikely to go undetected. Further, as Easterbrook has shown, treb-
ling in predatory pricing cases takes place over a baseline damages
award typically measured by a competitor's lost profits, which bears no
relationship to the optimal damages necessary to deter predation. 245
And this observation works apart from the fact described in Part L.A
that the culture of antitrust damages awards-strictness on causation
and antitrust injury but liberality on proof of amount of damages-
systemically inflates damages awards in predatory pricing cases. To-
gether, these features of antitrust law have costly consequences for
firms' incentives to engage in vigorous price competition.
It is difficult to see the justification for keeping the treble dam-
ages remedy in predatory pricing cases, given its tendency to discour-
age price cuts approaching the legally established price floor. One
possible argument is that single damages would lead to underdeter-
rence because if predatory pricing has a less than 100% detection
rate, the expected gains from predation would be positive. This argu-
ment not only wrongly assumes that a competitor's lost profits are a
fitting starting place for deterring would-be predators,2 46 but it also
ignores the fact that other features of antitrust litigation-statutory
fee shifting, the defendant's costs of defense, reputational costs with
customers and shareholders, and managerial risk aversion-provide
significant deterrent weight over the amount of the damages award.
Further, if liberality in proof of damages continues to be the practice
in those cases where predatory pricing is established, then little more
incentive is necessary to deter predation given the likelihood that it
will be detected. Eliminating the trebling rule for predation cases
244 See Baumol & Ordover, supra note 21, at 263 ("One should consider both the use of
a multiple smaller than three, at least in those types of cases, such as predatory pricing...
and in some types of cases one might even consider [single damages]."); Easterbrook,
supra note 149, at 329-30.
245 See Easterbrook, supra note 149, at 327.
246 See id.
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would be a simple way of minimizing the costs of predatory pricing
law.
2. Eliminating Competitor Standing
The chilling effects of predation law do not arise exclusively from
the fact that competitors are the primary enforcers, but almost so. Vir-
tually every private predatory pricing case is brought by a competitor,
and competitors have unique incentives to misuse predatory pricing
law to chill price competition. Competitors want to see higher prices
both in the short run and in the long run. The law tolerates their
complaint that prices were too low because of their further allegation
that the low prices would eventually lead to higher prices. But the law
does not require proof of actual higher prices. In an attempted-mo-
nopolization-through-predatory-pricing case, it is sufficient to prove
that defendant's low prices created a dangerous probability of subse-
quent higher prices.247 Thus, competitor-plaintiffs are often in the
position of asserting that defendant's prices were anticompetitively
low merely based on the speculation that, left unchecked, defendant
would have driven plaintiff from the market and raised its prices-
even though that never actually happened.
Giving firms the standing to challenge their rivals' prices as too
low on the theory that higher prices might eventually emerge is like
asking the fox to guard the henhouse. Consumers-the intended
beneficiaries of antitrust law-have exactly the opposite incentives as
competitors. They prefer sustainably low prices and therefore make
far better-intentioned predation enforcers than business rivals of the
predator. If predatory pricing were a frequent and successful enter-
prise, one would expect to see many class action lawsuits by
overcharged consumers. 248 Such lawsuits are extremely rare, 249 which
is probably more a testament to the absence of successful predation
schemes than to consumers' deficiencies as enforcers. The collective
action problems necessary to organize such suits are unlikely to be
247 See supra note 3.
248 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Class Actions, 36 VAND. L. REv. 213,
236-37 (1983) (discussing the possibility of class action lawsuits for overcharges following
predatory pricing and recoupment).
249 Such a class action is pending against 3M following a jury verdict by 3M's rival,
LePage's, in a case involving allegedly exclusionary bundled rebates. See supra note 12.
The case has a number of difficulties. At least one of 3M's ostensibly injured customers
and plaintiff class members-Staples-joined an amicus curiae brief urging the Supreme
Court to reverse LePage's jury verdict. See Brief for The Boeing Co.; Brunswick Corp.;
Caterpillar Inc.; Honeywell International Inc.; Northwest Airlines, Inc.; Staples, Inc.; and
Xerox Corp. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 3M Co. v. LePage's Inc., 124 S. Ct.
2932 (2004) (No. 02-1865), 2003 WL 22428377. Further, since 3M never succeeded in
driving LePage's from the market, the customers were beneficiaries of the allegedly preda-
tory prices without having to endure a period of recoupment.
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significantly greater than those for collusion cases brought by consum-
ers, which are not at all infrequent. Consumers may be ill-positioned
to detect predation as compared to competitors, 250 but that should
not be a serious obstacle to reliance on consumers as the primary
predatory pricing enforcers. Injured competitors would still have an
incentive to be on the lookout for instances of predatory pricing and
could communicate that information to plaintiffs' class action lawyers
who also share those incentives.
Of all the remedial proposals suggested here, Easterbrook's sug-
gestion that "[w]e should abandon reliance on competitors' suits to
enforce the rule against predation" 251 would produce the most imme-
diate and profound social gains. Except for the possibility of govern-
ment enforcement, this would effectively eliminate liability for
attempted monopolization through predation, since consumers
would have no standing to complain of below marginal cost prices
that failed to exclude a competitor or led to recoupment.252 As dis-
cussed in Part II.A, such pricing is allocatively inefficient, but of less
concern than monopoly pricing, because the harmful effects on con-
sumers are less certain. The law's interest in deterring monopoly pric-
ing is much stronger than its interest in deterring mistaken,
nonpredatory below-cost prices, which are likely to be quickly self-
correcting.
Eliminating competitor predation suits would make predation an
actual recoupment offense. This would eliminate the bizarre feature
of many predatory pricing cases where the only misconduct alleged is
prices that were too low and no proof is offered of resultant higher
prices, except in a speculative, predictive sense. It would focus preda-
tory pricing law on the conduct that is actually undesirable-monop-
oly pricing-and make the conduct that is generally desirable-price
cutting-merely a step in the necessary proof. Dominant firms would
be incentivized to worry about raising their prices if a competitor ex-
ited the market following a price war, but would be far less worried
about the initial price-cutting decision. This would put the incentives
in the proper places: Price cuts would be encouraged and price hikes
following a rival's exit discouraged. Making consumers the exclusive
private enforcers of predation law would result in far fewer predation
cases, but with far greater average merit than competitor suits, and
250 See Easterbook, supra note 149, at 331.
251 Id.
252 Theoretically, consumers could sue for an injunction against attempted monopoli-
zation through predation, but the likelihood that consumers would seek equitable reme-
dies in cases without damages is remote.
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would vastly diminish the problems of competitor misuse and chilling
innocent price cuts.25 3
3. Bilateral Fee Shifting
Part L.A described the possibility that less efficient firms strategi-
cally invoke predatory pricing law to raise the costs of their more effi-
cient rivals and thereby discourage aggressive price competition. If
this indeed occurs, a simple solution is to make fee shifting bilateral in
predatory pricing cases. This would make filing a meritless predatory
pricing lawsuit a negative expected value event and drastically under-
cut the attractiveness of predation as a strategic tool to chill price
competition. A bilateral fee-shifting rule would make it impossible for
a firm to raise its rival's costs through predatory pricing litigation un-
less the underlying claim had significant merit. In an unmeritorious
case, the plaintiff would only expect to raise its own costs. If as I sug-
gested in Part I.A, defendants tend to pay more to defend predatory
pricing cases than plaintiffs pay to prosecute them, then a bilateral
fee-shifting rule would more than double the expected costs of initiat-
ing predatory pricing suits, which would help to winnow predation
litigation to those cases where a substantial damages award is a signifi-
cant possibility. Those are the cases in which we should be least wor-
ried about chilling price competition and most interested in chilling
predation.
By increasing the costs of predatory pricing litigation as a cartel-
organizing tool, a bilateral fee-shifting rule would also discourage
firms from using predatory pricing lawsuits to try to organize tacit col-
lusion schemes. Firms might still conclude that the expected cost of
having to pay both their own fees and their rivals' litigation expenses
would be less than the gains from securing a tacit understanding on
pricing, but bilateral fee shifting would significantly reduce the
temptation.
A loser-pays fee-shifting regime for predation cases would dis-
courage injured rivals and consumers from suing except in very strong
predation cases, particularly given that the defendant's litigation ex-
penses are likely to exceed the plaintiff's. 25 4 While this might elimi-
nate some meritorious and socially beneficial predation suits, the
effects of bilateral fee shifting would be very much like that of requir-
ing proof of predation by clear and convincing evidence, as discussed
253 As discussed in the text accompanying notes 104-05, competitors can strategically
misuse even government-enforced predation law, and, even if consumers had exclusive
private standing, competitors could manipulate their customers for anticompetitive ends.
However, eliminating competitor standing would substantially reduce the incidence of stra-
tegic misuse by taking away a firm's right to seek treble damages and attorney's fees for
injuries resulting from its competitor's low prices.
254 See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
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above. Given defendants' risk aversion and the costs of being found
liable for predation, a remedial scheme that restricted predation suits
to those very likely to succeed would still have deterrent effects on
predatory conduct closer to the line of legality.
4. Prohibiting Discovery on Pricing and Costs Until Threshold
Showing of Market Screens
Part I.B described the possibility that firms use predatory pricing
litigation to exchange sensitive business information in discovery and
thereby facilitate tacit collusion. Whether or not firms intentionally
initiate predation suits in order to seek competitor information for
nefarious purposes, predatory pricing litigation almost invariably re-
sults in undesirable levels of information exchange. A partial solution
to this problem is for courts to order bifurcated discovery sua sponte,
limiting discovery to facts concerning threshold market screens-mar-
ket power, barriers to entry, and the like-until the plaintiff shows
based on these facts that predation was plausible in the relevant mar-
ket.25 5 Only after passing the market screen would plaintiff and de-
fendant be allowed information on one another's prices, costs,
strategic plans, and other sensitive competitive information. Even
then, discovery should be conducted under court-mandated and
strictly enforced protective orders limiting access to essential litigation
decision-makers only.
There is already some precedent for such bifurcation in preda-
tion cases. The parties have consented to it in some cases 256 and in
other cases it has been ordered by the court.257 Given the large num-
ber of predation cases that are dismissed based on market screens, 258
this practice would decrease the costs of litigation by initially limiting
discovery to issues that are likely to be dispositive. This would save the
parties litigation expenses, prevent a free flow of competitive informa-
tion, and diminish the attractiveness of predatory pricing litigation as
a strategic tool.
255 The rule proposed here would correspond with Joskow and Klevorick's proposal
for a two-tiered analysis in predation cases. In the first tier, a court would inquire whether
the relevant market was structurally susceptible to predation. If the court concluded that it
was, the court would proceed to the second tier and consider whether the defendant's
pricing behavior was exclusionary. SeeJoskow & Klevorick, supra note 163, at 242-62.
256 W. Parcel Express v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., 190 F.3d 974, 975 (9th Cir. 1999)
(reporting that defendant prevailed on summaryjudgment after the initial phase of discov-
ery, which was limited by stipulation of the parties to the issue of defendant's market
power).
257 Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Ad. Richfield Co., 133 F.R.D. 41, 45 (D. Nev. 1990) (limiting
discovery to facts concerning barriers to entry and not permitting discovery as to pricing
matters relevant to predatory pricing claims until plaintiff established the relevant market
and the existence of barriers to entry).
258 See supra note 129.
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A practice of bifurcated discovery in predation cases is the easiest
to implement of the remedial modifications suggested here because it
would not require congressional action. It is also the least effective of
the four changes I suggest and would be largely mooted by the elimi-
nation of competitor standing and, to a lesser degree, by making fee
shifting bilateral. Of the first three proposed changes, eliminating
competitor standing would produce the deepest changes in the incen-
tive structure of predation law and would largely remake predatory
pricing into an actual recoupment offense. Eliminating competitor
suits would also make bilateral fee shifting and permitting only single
damages relatively less necessary. If competitors are to continue as-
serting predation suits, then bilateral fee shifting and eliminating
treble damages are a worthwhile pair of remedial statutory changes.
CONCLUSION
The paradox of predatory pricing is that both prohibition and
nonregulation unavoidably result in social harm of the same kind-
upward deviation from optimal pricing. Left unregulated, some firms
would lower their prices to predatory levels to drive out rivals and sub-
sequently recoup through monopolistic prices. At the same time, any
prohibition on predatory pricing-no matter how carefully crafted-
will cause some firms to forgo socially beneficial price cuts because of
risk aversion, adjudicatory uncertainty, and the devilishly tempting op-
portunity for rivals to abuse a liability rule condemning excessively low
prices. Predatory pricing law is, inescapably, a "damned if you do,
damned if you don't" enterprise. This observation is not unique to
predatory pricing law. Many antitrust liability rules inescapably create
disincentives to engage in socially beneficial behavior and provide op-
portunities for rent-seeking rivals to abuse the legal system to stymie
efficient competition. Predatory pricing provides a particularly com-
pelling example of this phenomenon because the benefits of price
reduction to consumers are so immediate and obvious and the poten-
tial for abuse so correspondingly great.
Much of the disagreement over the optimal content of predatory
pricing liability rules seems to be influenced by the degree to which
one believes in the risks of false positives and false negatives and, be-
yond adjudicatory error, the general disposition of firms to deviate
from optimal pricing because of, or in the absence of, a legal prohibi-
tion on predation. This Article has attempted to give a fuller account
of the costs of overdeterrence-particularly as they relate to strategic
misuse and the remedial features of U.S. antitrust law. To be sure,
overdeterrence is only half of the story, but it is the half that has re-
ceived less than half of the attention, even though it may account for
more than half of the problem. As the theoretic inquiry about the
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optimal structure of predatory pricing law continues, it is a part of the
story that deserves equal time.
Predatory pricing has been heavily theorized but underexplored
empirically. Most of the empirical work on predation has concerned
litigated cases-which may not be representative of the wider influ-
ences of predation law-and older cases (for example, Standard Oil
and the Gunpowder Trust259 ), which may not reflect present eco-
nomic realities. Reaching a broad consensus on optimal liability and
remedial rules to govern predatory pricing would be much aided by
more detailed empirical inquiry into the extent to which firms engage
and succeed in pricing strategies designed to exclude rivals or strategi-
cally misuse predation law to chill price competition. This Article has
suggested several useful lines of inquiry and taken some modest steps
toward providing data on the penetration of predation law into busi-
ness culture and consciousness. Much more work along these lines
awaits. In the meantime, deliberate underinclusion in defining and
adjudging the predation offense seems the wisest way to handle the
predatory pricing paradox.
259 See, e.g., Kenneth G. Elzinga, Predatory Pricing: The Case of the Gunpowder Trust, 13J.L.
& ECON. 223 (1970).
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